III
The Function of This Branch of Science
(See Exposition on Brief, Chapter 3)
W
ITH REGARD to all knowledge, that holds
true which Goethe expressed so aptly in the words: “Theory is
of no use in and of itself save as it causes us to believe in the
interrelationship of phenomena.” By means of science, we are
always bringing separate facts of experience into relationship. We
perceive in inorganic Nature causes and effects separated, and
we seek for their connection in the appropriate sciences. In the
organic world we become aware of species and genera of organisms, and
we endeavor to establish the reciprocal relationships among
them. Single cultural epochs of humanity appear before us in
history, and we endeavor to learn the inner dependence of one
evolutionary stage upon another. Thus every branch of science has to
work in some definite field of phenomena in the sense conveyed by the
statement quoted above from Goethe.
Each branch of science has its sphere
in which it seeks for the interrelationship among phenomena. But
there yet remains a great antithesis in our scientific endeavors: on
one side, the ideal world [die
ideele
Welt — the world
of ideas] gained by the sciences, and, on the
other, the objects upon which that world is based. There must be a
branch of science which here also clarifies the interrelationships.
The ideal and the real world, the antithesis between idea and
reality, — these constitute the problem of such a science.
These contrasting elements also must be understood in their
reciprocal relationships.
It is the purpose
of the following discussion to seek for these relationships. The
facts of science on the one hand and Nature and history on the other
are to be brought into relationship. What is the significance of the
reflection of the external world in human consciousness? What
relationship exists between our thinking about the objects of reality
and these objects themselves?
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