XIV
Cognition and the Ultimate Foundation of Things
(See Exposition on Brief, Chapter 14)
K
ANT TOOK
a great step forward in philosophy
in that he directed man's attention to himself. He must seek the
reasons for certitude regarding his affirmations in that which
is given to him as the capacities of his own mind, and not in truths
forced upon him from without. Scientific conviction only through
oneself, — that is the slogan of the Kantian philosophy.
It is for this reason especially that he called it a critical and not
dogmatic philosophy, such as maintains ready-made postulates as
handed down and seeks afterwards for the proofs of these. Here
appears a contradiction between two scientific trends; but this was
not thought out by Kant with that distinctness to which it lends
itself.
Let us fix clearly
in mind how a scientific postulate comes into existence. It unites
two things — either a concept and a percept or two concepts. Of
the latter sort, for example, is the postulate: No effect without a
cause. It may be that the objective reasons why the two concepts flow
together lie beyond that which these contain in themselves, and which
alone, therefore, is given to me. I may then have all sorts of formal
reasons (freedom from contradiction, fixed axioms) which lead me to a
definite combining of thoughts. But these reasons have no
influence upon the thing itself. The postulate rests upon something
which I can never reach in an objective manner. Therefore, I can
never have a real insight into the thing; I know about it only as one
standing outside it. According to this view, that which the
postulate expresses is in a world unknown to me; the postulate alone
is in my own world. This is the character of dogma. There are two
sorts of dogma: the dogma of revelation and that of experience. The
former hands down to man, in some way or other, truths about things
which are beyond the reach of his vision. He possesses no insight
into the world from which these postulates spring. He must simply
believe in their verity, and cannot get access to the reasons for
this belief. The case is quite similar with dogmas of experience. If
any one holds the opinion that we should simply limit ourselves to
pure experience and can merely observe its transmutations without
penetrating to the causative forces, he is applying to the world
postulates whose reasons are inaccessible to him. Here also truth is
not attained by insight into the inner agency of the thing, but it is
imposed by what is exterior to the thing itself. If earlier science
was dominated by the dogmas of revelation, contemporary science is
suffering from the dogmas of experience.
Our study has
shown us that any assumption of a fundamental source of Being which
exists outside the Idea is nonsense. The total fundamental essence of
Being has poured itself out in the world; it has passed over into the
world. In thought, it is manifest in its most complete form,
just as it is, in and of itself. If, then, thinking forms a
combination, if a judgment occurs, it is the content of the
World-Fundament itself, poured out into thought, which is thus
united. In thought, postulates are not given to us about a
yonder-side World-Fundament, but this in its very substance has
flowed into thought. We have a direct insight into the
objective, not merely the formal, grounds for the formation of a
judgment. The judgment reaches a characterization, not about
something alien, but about its own content. Therefore, our view
lays foundations for a true knowledge. Our theory of knowledge is
really critical. According to our view, not only need nothing be
conceded to revelation for which thought itself does not contain
objective reasons, but also experience must be cognized within
thought, not only on the side of its manifestation, but also as
causative. By means of our thinking, we lift ourselves from
perceiving reality as product to perceiving it as that which
produces.
The essential
nature of a thing thus comes to light only when the thing is brought
into relation with man. For only in man does the real Being appear
for each thing. This truth lays the foundation for a relativism
as a world view — that is, the trend of thought which assumes
that we see all things in the light which is lent to them by man
himself. This point of view bears the name Anthropomorphism. It has
many exponents. Most of these, however, believe that this
peculiarity of our cognition alienates us from objectivity as it is
in and of itself. We perceive all, so they think, through the
spectacles of subjectivity. Our conception shows us the exact
opposite of this. If we would reach the essential nature of
things, we must view them through these spectacles. The world
is not merely known to us as it appears, but it appears as it is,
although only to thinking contemplation. The form of reality which
man delineates in his knowledge is its final true
form.
And now we have
still to extend to the individual fields of reality that form of
cognition which we have come to recognize as the right form —
as leading to reality in its true nature. We shall now show how the
real nature of experience is to be found in its individual
forms.
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