F. THE SPIRITUAL, OR CULTURAL,
SCIENCES
XVII
Introduction: Spirit and Nature
(See Exposition on Brief, Chapter 17)
W
E HAVE
exhausted the realm of the knowledge of Nature.
Organics is the highest form of natural science. What lies still
higher is the spiritual, or cultural, sciences. These re-* quire an
essentially different attitude of the human mind toward objects from
that characterizing the natural sciences. In the latter the mind has
a universal role to play. Its task is, so to speak, to bring the
world process itself to a conclusion. What existed without the mind
was only one half of reality; it was incomplete, at every point
only a fragment. There the mind has to call forth into phenomenal
existence the innermost impelling forces of reality — even
though these would have possessed validity without its subjective
intervention. If man were a mere sense-being without mental
conception, inorganic Nature would be, none the less, dependent upon
natural laws; but these would never come as such into manifest
existence. Beings would certainly exist who would perceive the
product (the sense-world) but they would never perceive the producing
(the inner conformity to law). It is really the genuine, and
indeed the truest, form of Nature which comes to manifestation in the
human mind, whereas for a mere sense-being only Nature's external
aspect would exist. Knowledge plays here a role of world
significance. It is the conclusion of the work of creation. What
takes place in human consciousness is the interpretation of Nature to
itself. Thought is the last member in the series of processes whereby
Nature is formed.
Not so is it in
the case of cultural science. Here our consciousness has to do
with spiritual content itself; with the individual human spirit, with
the creations of culture, of literature, with the successive
scientific convictions, with the creations of art. The spiritual is
grasped by the spirit. Reality possesses here in itself the ideal,
conformity to law, which elsewhere appears first in mental
conception. What appears in the natural sciences only as a product of
reflection about the object is here born in the object. Knowledge
plays a different role; essential being would be present in the
objects here without the work of knowledge. It is human
actions, creations, ideas with which we have to do. It is an
interpretation of the human being to himself and to his race.
Knowledge has here a different mission to discharge from that in
connection with Nature.
Here again this
mission first becomes manifest as a human need. Just as the necessity
of finding, in connection with the reality of Nature, the Idea of
Nature appears at first as a need of our minds, so here also the
function of cultural science exists first as a human impulse. Again
it is only an objective fact announcing itself as a subjective
need.
The human being should not, like a
being of inorganic Nature, act upon another being according to
external norms, according to law which dominates him; nor should he
be the single form of a general type; but he should himself fix the
purpose, the goal, of his existence, of his activity. If his actions
are the results of laws, these laws must be such as he gives to
himself. What he is in himself, what he is among his own kind, in
state and in history, — this he must not be by reason of
external determinations. He must be this of himself. How he
fits himself into the texture of the world depends upon himself. He
must find the point at which to participate in the mechanism of the
world. It is here that the cultural sciences receive their function.
Man must know the spiritual world in order to take his share in that
world according to this knowledge. Here originates the mission which
psychology, the science of peoples, [Volkskunde] and the
science of history have to achieve.
This is the
essence of Nature: that law and activity fall apart from each other,
and activity seems to be controlled by law; but this, on the
contrary, is the essence of freedom: that the two coincide,
that the producing shall exist immediately in the product and that
the product shall be master of itself.
Therefore, the
cultural sciences are in the highest degree sciences of freedom. The
idea of freedom must be their central point, their dominant idea. It
is for this reason that Schiller's letters on aesthetics take
such high rank, because they undertake to find the nature of beauty
in the idea of freedom, because freedom is the principle which
permeates them.
The spirit takes only that place in
the universal, in the totality of the world, which it gives to itself
as an individual. While the universal, the type Idea, must be kept
constantly in mind in organics, the idea of personality is to be held
fast in the spiritual sciences. Not the Idea as it lives in the
general (the type) but as it appears in the single being (the
individual), is here the matter in question. Naturally, it is not the
casual personality, not this or that personality, which is
determinative, but personality as such; not, however, as this evolves
from itself outward into specialized forms and so comes first to sensible
existence, but sufficient in itself, within itself circumscribed,
finding in itself its destiny.
The destiny of the
type is to find itself realized in the individual. The destiny
of the person is to achieve, even as an ideal entity, actual
self-sustaining existence. When we speak of humanity in general
and when we speak of a general natural law, these are two quite
different things. In the latter case the particular is
determined by the general; in the idea of humanity, the general is
determined by the particular. If we are able to discern general laws
of history, these are such only in so far as they were set up by
historical personalities as goals, or ideals. This is the inner
contrast between Nature and spirit. The former requires a knowledge
which ascends from the immediately given, as the conditioned, to that
which can be grasped by the mind, to the conditioning; the latter
requires such a knowledge as proceeds from the given as the
conditioning to the conditioned. That the particular establishes the
law is characteristic of the spiritual sciences; that this role
belongs to the general characterizes the natural
sciences.
That which is
valuable to us in the natural sciences only as a transitional point
— the particular — is our sole interest in the spiritual
sciences. That which we seek in the former case, the general, is in
the latter considered only to the extent that it interprets to
us the particular.
It would be
contrary to the spirit of science if in the presence of Nature we
should limit ourselves to the particular. But it would be utterly
fatal to the spirit if we should comprehend Greek history, for
example, in a general scheme of concepts. In the former case, the
senses, cleaving to the phenomenal, would achieve no science; in the
latter the mind, proceeding according to a general pattern, would
lose all sense for the individual.
|