PAGE 2: The mood underlying this opinion, in regard to the character
of philosophical writing and the interest which this evokes, is
derived from the temper of mind characterizing scientific endeavors
about the middle of the 'eighties of the last century. Since
that time phenomena have arisen in the presence of which this opinion
seems no longer justified. One need think only of the dazzling
illumination which broad expanses of life have received from
Nietzsche's thought and feeling. And in the struggle which has been
in process and still continues between the materialistically-minded
monists and the exponents of a spiritual world-conception there is
vitally manifest both the aspiration of philosophic thought to a
life-filled content and also the widespread general interest in the
enigmas of existence. Ways of thought derived from a physical
world-conception, such as those of Einstein, have become the topic of
almost universal conversations and literary
publications.
And yet the motives from which that opinion then arose still possess
validity. If the opinion were being recorded today, it would need to
be differently formulated. Now that it is again given as an almost
ancient point of view, it may be more appropriate to say to what
extent it is still valid.
Goethe's world-conception, whose theory of knowledge it has been the
purpose of the present composition to point out, issues from the inner
experience of the whole human being. In comparison with this
inner experience, the examination of the world through thought
is only one aspect. Out of the fullness of man's existence, thought
forms rise, as it were, to the surface of the soul's life. A part of
these thought-images comprise an answer to the question: What is
human cognition? And this answer is of such a character as to
indicate that man's existence attains that for which it is endowed
only when it is engaged in the activity of cognition. A soul-life
apart from cognition would be like a human organism without a head:
that is, it simply would not be at all. Within the inner life of the
soul a content arises which craves external perception as the
hungering organism craves food; and in the external world there
is a perceptual content which does not bear its essential being in
itself but manifests this only when it is united with the soul
content through the process of cognition. Thus the process
becomes a link in the formation of universal reality. In the act of
cognizing, man participates in the creation of this universal
reality. If a plant-root is unthinkable apart from the fulfillment of
its potentialities in the fruit, so likewise neither man nor even the
world attains to a culmination apart from cognition. In the act of
cognition, man does not create something only for himself, but
he works creatively together with the world at the revelation
of real Being. What is in man is the phenomenal as Idea; what is in
the perceptual world is the phenomenal as the sensible; only the
conjunction of the two in cognition is reality.
Viewed thus, a theory of knowledge
becomes a part of life. And it must be viewed thus, if it is to be
united with the expanses of life in Goethe's soul-experience. But
even Nietzsche's thinking and feeling do not unite themselves with
such breadths of life. Still less is this true of
such conceptions of the world and of life as have appeared
since the composition of what has been designated as the “Point
of Departure” in the present production. All these presuppose
that reality exists somewhere outside of cognition, and that a human
representation reproducing this reality comes about in cognition
— or cannot come about. That this reality cannot be found by
means of cognition because it is first created as reality in
cognition — this is almost nowhere realized. Those who
think philosophically seek for life and existence outside of
knowledge; Goethe stands within creative life and Being while he
engages in the activity of cognition. For this reason the more recent
attempts at world-conceptions take their stand outside of Goethe's
idea-creating. It is the purpose of this theory of knowledge to stand
within that, because in this way philosophy gains life-content and
that interest which is its vital need.
PAGE 94: “This distinction is not made so
basic in any other manner of research ... as in Goethe's.” It will
be found that I have expressed myself in various ways in my writings regarding
mysticism and the mystical. That there is no contradiction in these
various ways of speaking — as some persons have tried
fantastically to show — may be seen in each instance from the
context. One may form a general conception of the mystical. According
to this it embraces what may be learned of the world through the
soul's inner experience. This concept is not, for the time being, to
be opposed. For there is such an experience. And it reveals
something, not only about the inner being of man, but also about the
world. It is necessary to have eyes wherein processes occur in order
to experience the realm of colors. But one thereby learns something,
not only about the eye, but also about the world. One must possess an
inner soul-organ in order to experience certain things of the world.
But one must carry
full clarity of concepts into one's experience through the mystical
organ if knowledge is to come about. There are persons, however, who
wish to take refuge in the “inward” for the purpose of
escaping from clarity of concepts. These apply the term
“mystical” to that which would lead knowledge away from
the light of ideas into the darkness of the world of feeling
— the world of feeling, not illuminated by ideas. Against this
mysticism I have expressed myself throughout my writings. On behalf
of that mysticism which holds fast to the clarity of ideas, and makes
of the mystic sense a perceptual organ of the soul which functions in
the same region of the human being where otherwise obscure
feeling is dominant, every page of my books has been written. With
respect to the spiritual this sense is to be compared precisely with
the eye or the ear in relation to the physical.
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