13. The Activity of Knowing
Reality has separated itself for us into two realms: into experience
and thinking. Experience comes into consideration in a twofold way.
Firstly, insofar as all reality except thinking has a form of
manifestation that must appear in the form of experience; and
secondly, insofar as it lies in the nature of our spirit whose
being after all consists in contemplation, i.e., in an activity
directed outward that the objects to be observed must enter its
field of vision, which is to say that they be given to it as
experience. Now it could be the case that this form of the
given does not contain the essential being (Wesen)
of the thing, in which case the thing itself demands that it first
manifest to perception (experience) in order later to reveal its
essential being to an activity of our spirit that goes beyond
perception. Another possibility is that the essential being is already
present within the directly given, and that it is only due
to the second factthat for our spirit everything must come
before its gaze as experiencethat we do not immediately become
aware of this essential being. The latter is the case with thinking;
the former is the case with the rest of reality. With thinking it is
only necessary for us to overcome our own subjective limitations in
order to grasp its core. What, with the rest of reality, is factually
based in the objective perception namely, that its immediate
form of appearance must be overcome in order to explain it this,
with thinking, lies only in a peculiarity of our spirit. With the rest
of reality, it is the thing itself that gives itself the form of
experience; with thinking, it is the organization of our spirit. With
the rest of reality, we do not have the whole thing when we grasp
experience; with thinking we do.
Therein lies the basis of the dualism that science the thinking
activity of knowing has to overcome. The human being finds
himself confronted by two worlds whose connection he must establish.
One of them is experience, about which he knows that it contains only
half of reality; the other is thinking, which is complete in itself,
and into which that outer perceptual reality must flow if a satisfying
world view is to result. If the world were inhabited merely by sense
beings, its essential being (its ideal content) would remain forever
hidden; laws would indeed govern the processes of the world, but these
laws would not come to manifestation. For these laws to come to
manifestation, a being would have to insert itself between the
phenomenal form and the law, a being to whom is given in
addition to the organs through which it perceives the
sense-perceptible form of reality that is dependent upon the laws
also the ability to perceive the lawfulness itself. The sense
world must approach such a being from one side, and the ideal
essential being of the sense world from the other, and such a being
must, in its own activity, unite these two factors of reality.
Here one sees perfectly well and clearly that our spirit is not to be
regarded as a receptacle for the world of ideas, containing the
thoughts within itself, but rather as an organ that perceives these
thoughts.
It is an organ of apprehension in exactly the same way as eyes and
ears are. A thought relates itself to our spirit in no other way than
light does to the eye and sound to the ear. It certainly would not
occur to anyone to regard color as something that imprints itself in a
lasting way upon the eye, and, as it were, remains sticking to the
eye. But with respect to the spirit this view is in fact the
predominant one. A thought about each thing supposedly takes shape in
consciousness, and this thought then remains in one's consciousness,
in order to be taken out again when needed. One has based a whole
theory on this, claiming that thoughts of which we are not for the
moment conscious are in fact stored up within our spirit, but lying
below the threshold of consciousness.
These fantastic views dissolve at once into nothing when one reflects
that the world of ideas is after all determined out of itself. What
does this self-determined content have to do with the multiplicity of
consciousnesses? One will surely not assume that this content
determines itself in indeterminate multiplicity in such a way that
each partial content is always independent of the other! The matter is
indeed utterly clear. The thought-content is such that absolutely all
that is needed for it to manifest is a spiritual organ, but the number
of beings endowed with this organ is of no significance. Any number of
spirit-endowed individuals can therefore confront the one content of
thoughts. The human spirit, therefore, perceives the thought-content
of the world as an organ of apprehension. There is only one
thought-content of the world. Our consciousness is not the ability to
produce and store up thoughts, as so many people believe, but rather
the ability to perceive thoughts (ideas). Goethe expressed this aptly
with the words: The idea is eternal and single; that we also use
the plural is not appropriate. All things of which we become aware and
about which we are able to speak are only manifestations of the idea;
concepts are what we express, and to this extent the idea itself is a
concept.
As a citizen of two worlds of the sense world and of the
thought-world, the one pressing toward him from below, the other one
shining from above the human being takes possession of science,
by which he joins the two into an undivided unity. From one side the
outer form beckons to us, from the other side the inner essential
being; we must unite the two. With this, our epistemology has lifted
itself above the standpoint that similar investigations usually take
and that does not get beyond formalism. One says that the
activity of knowing is to work upon experience, without
specifying what it is that is worked into experience; the definition
is set up that in the activity of knowing, the perception flows
into thinking, or that thinking, by virtue of an inner compulsion from
experience, penetrates to the essential being behind experience.
But this is mere formalism. A science of knowledge that wishes to
grasp the activity of knowing in its universally significant role must
first of all indicate its ideal purpose. This purpose consists of
bringing incomplete experience to completion by revealing its core.
Second, it must determine what this core is, with respect to content.
This core is thought, idea. Third and last, it must show how this
revealing takes place. Our chapter on Thinking and
Perception demonstrates this. Our epistemology leads to the
positive conclusion that thinking is the essential being of the world
and that individual (individuelle) human thinking is the
individual (einzelne) form of manifestation of this essential
being. A merely formalistic science of knowledge cannot do this; it
remains forever unfruitful. It has no view about the nature of the
relationship existing between what science gains and the essential
being and processes of the world. And yet it is precisely within
epistemology that this relationship must be found. This science must
show us, after all, where we arrive through our knowing activity and
where every other science leads us.
By no other path than epistemology does one come to the view that
thinking is the core of the world. For, it shows us thinking's
connection with the rest of reality. But out of what should we become
aware of thinking's relationship to experience if not out of the
science whose immediate aim is to investigate this relationship? And
furthermore, how would we know that any spiritual or sense-perceptible
being is the primal force of the world if we have not investigated its
relationship to reality? If, therefore, we are ever concerned with
discovering the essential being of something, this discovering always
consists of going back to the ideal content of the world. One may not
step outside the realm of this content if one wishes to remain within
clear determinants and not grope about indeterminately. Thinking is a
totality in itself, sufficient unto itself, that cannot overstep
itself without entering a void. In other words, in order to explain
something, thinking may not take refuge in things it does not find
within itself. A thing not encompassed by thinking would be a
non-thing. Everything ultimately merges with thinking; everything
finds its place within thinking.
Expressed in terms of our individual consciousness, this means that,
for the purpose of establishing anything scientifically, we must
remain strictly within what is given us in consciousness; we cannot
step outside of this. Now, if one recognizes fully that we cannot skip
over our consciousness without landing in non-being, but does not
recognize at the same time that the essential being of things is to be
encountered in our consciousness in the perception of ideas, erroneous
views then arise that speak of a limit to our knowledge. But if we
cannot get outside our consciousness, and if the essential being of
reality is not within it, then we cannot press forward to essential
being at all.
Our thinking is bound to what is here and knows nothing of any beyond.
In our view, the opinion that there is a limit to knowledge is nothing
but a thinking that misunderstands itself. A limit to knowledge would
be possible only if outer experience in itself forced us to
investigate its essential being, if it determined the questions that
are to be raised in its presence. But this is not the case. For
thinking the need arises to hold out, toward the experience of which
it becomes aware, the essential being of this experience. After all,
thinking can have only the quite definite tendency to see its own
inherent lawfulness in the rest of the world, but not something or
other about which it itself has not the least information.
Another error must still be rectified here. It is to the effect that
thinking is not adequate to constitute the world, that some other
factor (force, will, etc.) must still join with this thought-content
in order to make the world possible.
Upon closer examination, however, one sees at once that all such
factors turn out to be nothing more than abstractions from the
perceptual world that are themselves awaiting explanation by thinking.
Every other component part of the being of the world except thinking
would also require at once a kind of apprehension, a way of being
known, different from that of thinking. We would have to reach that
other component part in another way than through thinking. For,
thinking yields only thoughts after all. But one is already
contradicting oneself in wanting to explain the part played by that
second component in world processes, and by making use of concepts in
order to do so. Furthermore, however, there is no third element given
us in addition to sense perception and thinking. And we cannot accept
any part of sense perception as the core of the world, because, to
closer scrutiny, all its components show that as such they do not
contain their essential being. The essential being can therefore be
sought simply and solely in thinking.
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