9. Thinking and Consciousness
Now, however, it seems as though we ourselves are bringing in the
subjective element here, which we had wanted so decisively to keep out
of our epistemology. Although the rest of the perceptual world does
not bear a subjective character — as one could gather from our
discussions — thoughts do, in fact, bear such a character, even
according to our view.
This objection is based on a confusion of two things: the stage upon
which our thoughts appear, and the element which determines their
content, from which they receive their inner lawfulness. We definitely
do not produce a thought-content as though, in this production, we were
the ones who determined into which connections our thoughts are to enter.
We only provide the opportunity for the thought-content to unfold itself
in accordance with its own nature. We grasp thought a
and thought b and give them the opportunity to enter into a lawful
connection by bringing them into mutual interaction with each other.
It is not our subjective organization that determines this particular
connection between a and b in precisely one particular way and no
other. The human spirit effects the joining of thought masses only in
accordance with their content. In thinking we therefore fulfill the
principle of experience in its most basic form.
This refutes the view of Kant, of Schopenhauer, and in a broader sense
also of Fichte, which states that the laws we assume for the purpose
of explaining the world are only a result of our own spiritual
organization and that we lay them into the world only by virtue of our
spiritual individuality.
One could raise yet another objection from the subjectivistic
standpoint. Even if the lawful connection of thought-masses is not
brought about by us in accordance with our organization but rather is
dependent upon their content, still, this very content itself might be
a purely subjective product, a mere quality of our spirit; thus we
would only be uniting elements that we ourselves first created. Then
our thought-world would be no less a subjective semblance. It is very
easy to meet this objection, however. If it had any basis, we would
then be connecting the content of our thinking according to laws whose
origins would truly be unknown to us. If these laws do not spring from
our subjectivity — and this subjectivity is the view we disputed
earlier and can now regard as refuted — then what should provide
us with laws by which to interconnect a content we ourselves create?
Our thought-world is therefore an entity fully founded upon itself; it
is a self-contained totality, perfect and complete in itself. Here we
see which of the two aspects of the thought-world is the essential one:
the objective aspect of its content, and not the
subjective aspect of the way it arises.
This insight into the inner soundness and completeness of thinking
appears most clearly in the scientific system of Hegel. No one has
credited thinking, to the degree he did, with a power so complete that
it could found a world view out of itself. Hegel had an absolute trust
in thinking; it is, in fact, the only factor of reality that he
trusted in the true sense of the word. But no matter how correct his
view is in general, he is still precisely the one who totally
discredited thinking through the all too extreme form in which he
defended it. The way he presented his view is to blame for the
hopeless confusion that has entered our “thinking about
thinking.” He wanted to make the significance of thoughts, of
ideas, really visible by declaring the necessity in thought to be at
the same time the necessity in the factual world. He therefore gave
rise to the error that the characterizations made by thinking are not
purely ideal ones but rather factual ones. One soon took his view to
mean that he sought, in the world of sense-perceptible reality, even
thoughts as though they were objects. He never really did make this
very clear. It must indeed be recognized that the field of thoughts is
human consciousness alone. Then it must be shown that the
thought-world forfeits none of its objectivity through this fact.
Hegel demonstrated only the objective side of thoughts, but most
people see only the subjective side, because this is easier; and it
seems to them that he treated something purely ideal as though it were
an object, that he made it into something mystical. Even many
contemporary scholars cannot be said to be free of this error. They
condemn Hegel for a failing he himself did not have, but which, to be
sure, one can impute to him because he did not clarify this matter
sufficiently.
We acknowledge that there is a difficulty here for our power of
judgment. But we believe that this difficulty can be overcome by
energetic thinking. We must picture two things to ourselves: first,
that we actively bring the ideal world into manifestation, and
at the same time, that what we actively call into existence is
founded upon its own laws. Now admittedly, we are used to picturing
a phenomenon in such a way that we need only approach it and passively
observe it. This is not an absolute requirement, however. No matter how
unusual it might be for us to picture that we ourselves actively bring
something objective into manifestation — that we do not merely perceive
a phenomenon, in other words, but produce it at the same time — it is
not inadmissible for us to do so.
One simply needs to give up the usual opinion that there are as many
thought-worlds as there are human individuals. This opinion is in any
case nothing more than an old preconception from the past. It is
tacitly assumed everywhere, without people realizing that there is
another view at least just as possible, and that the reasons must
first be weighed as to the validity of one or the other. Instead of
this opinion, let us consider the following one: There is absolutely
only one single thought-content, and our individual thinking is
nothing more than our self, our individual personality, working its
way into the thought-center of the world. This is not the place to
investigate whether this view is correct or not, but it is possible,
and we have accomplished what we wanted; we have shown that what we
have presented as the necessary objectivity of thinking can easily be
seen not to contradict itself even in another context.
With regard to objectivity, the work of the thinker can very well be
compared with that of the mechanic. Just as the mechanic brings the
forces of nature into mutual interplay and thereby effects a
purposeful activity and release of power, so the thinker lets the
thought-masses enter into lively interaction, and they develop into
the thought-systems that comprise our sciences.
Nothing sheds more light on a view than exposing the errors that stand
in its way. Let us call upon this method once again as one that has
often been used by us to advantage.
One usually believes that we join certain concepts into larger
complexes, or that we think in general in a certain way, because we
feel a certain inner (logical) compulsion to do so. Even Volkelt
adheres to this view. But how does this view accord with the
transparent clarity with which our entire thought-world is present in
our consciousness? We know absolutely nothing in the world more
exactly than our thoughts. Now can it really be supposed that a
certain connection is established on the basis of an inner compulsion,
where everything is so clear? Why do I need the compulsion, if I know
the nature of what is to be joined, know it through and through, and
can therefore guide myself by it? All our thought-operations are
processes that occur on the basis of insight into the entities of
thoughts and not according to a compulsion. Any such compulsion
contradicts the nature of thinking.
Nonetheless, it could be the case that it is the nature of thinking to
impress its content into its own manifestation at the same time, and
that, because of our spirit's organization, we are nevertheless unable
to perceive this content directly. But this is not the case. The way
thought-content approaches us is our guarantee that here we have
before us the essential being of the thing. We are indeed conscious of
the fact that we accompany every process in the thought world with our
spirit. One can nevertheless think of the form of manifestation only
as being determined by the essential being of the thing. How would we
be able to reproduce the form of manifestation if we did not know the
essential being of the thing? One can very well think that the form of
manifestation confronts us as a finished totality and that we then
seek its core. But one absolutely cannot believe that one is a
co-worker in this production of the phenomenon without effecting this
production from within the core.
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