vii EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCLUSION
WE HAVE ESTABLISHED
that the theory of knowledge is a science of
significance for all human knowledge. The theory of knowledge alone
can explain to us the relationship which the contents of the various
branches of knowledge have to the world. Combined with them it enables
us to understand the world, to attain a world-view. We acquire
positive insight through particular judgments; through the theory of
knowledge we learn the value of this insight for reality. Because we
have adhered strictly to this absolutely fundamental principle and
have not evaluated any particular instances of knowledge in our
discussion, we have transcended all one-sided world-views. One-sidedness,
as a rule, results from the fact that the enquiry, instead of first
investigating the process of cognition itself, immediately approaches
some object of this process. Our discussion has shown that in dogmatism,
the “thing-in-itself” cannot be employed as its fundamental
principle; similarly, in subjective idealism, the “I”
cannot be fundamental, for the mutual relationship of these principles
must first be defined by thinking. The “thing-in-itself” and
“I” cannot be defined by deriving one from the other; both must be
defined by thinking in conformity with their character and relationship. The
adherent of scepticism must cease to doubt the possibility of knowing
the world, for there is no room for doubt in regard to the “given”
— it is still untouched by all predicates later bestowed on it by means
of cognition. Should the sceptic maintain that our cognitive thinking
can never approach the world, he can only maintain this with the help of
thinking, and in so doing refutes himself. Whoever attempts to
establish doubt in thinking by means of thinking itself admits, by
implication, that thinking contains a power strong enough to support a
conviction. Lastly, our theory of knowledge transcends both onesided
empiricism and onesided rationalism by uniting them at a
higher level. In this way, justice is done to both. Empiricism
is justified by showing that as far as content is concerned, all knowledge
of the given is to be attained only through direct contact with the given.
And it will be found that this view also does justice to rationalism
in that thinking is declared to be both the necessary and the only
mediator of knowledge.
The world-view which has the closest affinity to the one presented
here, built up on epistemological foundations, is that of
A. E. Biedermann.
[ 120 ]
But to establish his standpoint, Biedermann uses concepts
which do not belong in a theory of knowledge at all. He works with
concepts such as existence, substance, space, time, etc., without
having first investigated the process of cognition alone. Instead of
first establishing the fact that in the process of cognition, to begin
with, two elements only are present, the given and thinking — he
speaks of reality as existing in different forms. For example,
[ 121 ]
he says:
“Every content of consciousness contains two fundamental factors;
two kinds of existence are given to us in it, and these opposites
we designate as physical and spiritual, or as bodily
and ideal.” (¶ 15) “What exists in space and time is
material, but the foundation of all processes of existence, the subject
of life, this also exists, but as an ideal; it has ideal being.”
(¶ 19)
Such considerations do not belong in a theory of knowledge, but in
metaphysics, which in turn can be established only by means of a
theory of knowledge. Admittedly, much of what Biedermann maintains is
very similar to what I maintain, but the methods used to arrive at
this are utterly different. No reason to draw any direct comparison
has thus arisen. Biedermann seeks to attain an epistemological
standpoint by means of a few metaphysical axioms. The attempt here is
to acquire insight into reality by observing the process of cognition.
And we believe that we have shown that all conflicts between
world-views result from a tendency to attempt to attain knowledge of
something objective (thing, I, consciousness, etc.) without having
first gained a sufficiently exact knowledge of what alone can
elucidate all knowledge: the nature of knowledge itself.
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