Part 4
These contemplations would not like to answer the question: who
wanted this war? out of such a mood of soul as some
personalities of the countries at war with Middle Europe do.
They would like to let the conditions influencing the events
speak on their own. He who is writing down these contemplations
asked among Russians whether they had wanted a war against
Middle Europe. —
To him, what Renan predicted
in the year 1870 seems to lead onto a surer path than the judgments
presently pronounced out of passion. This seems to him to be a
path to the only region of judgment which, regarding the war,
can and should be entered upon by him too who makes himself
mental representations about what judgments of thought are
superfluous and inappropriate when the judgments of deed by the
weapons have to decide about the destinies of peoples out of
blood and death.
It
is certain that driving powers pushing for war can be compelled
by other forces into a life of peace long enough until they
have weakened in themselves so far that they become
ineffective. And whoever has to suffer from this
effective ness will make an effort to create these
peacekeeping forces. The course of history shows that for
years, Germany has taken upon itself this effort concerning the
will forces streaming from West and East. Everything else that
one can say regarding the present war in the direction of
France's and Russia's driving powers weighs less than the
simple, patent fact that these driving powers were
sufficiently deeply anchored in the willing of these two
countries to defy everything that wanted to hold them down.
Whoever states this fact does not necessarily have to be
reckoned among those personalities who judge out of inclination
or disinclination, predetermined by the events — quite
comprehensible in this time, of course — toward this or
that people. Disdain, hatred, or the like need have nothing to
do with such formation of judgment. How one loves such things,
or does not love them, how one assesses them in feelings, is
entirely another matter than setting forth the simple fact. It
also has nothing to do with how one loves or does not love the
French, how one values their Spirit, when one believes one has
reasons for the opinion that driving powers to be found in
France are entwined in the present war complications. What is
said about such driving forces as are present in peoples, can
be kept free of what falls within the realm of accusation or
blame in the usual sense.
One
will seek in vain among the Germans for such driving forces as
had to lead to the present war in a similar way to those
characterized by Solovieff among the Russians, proclaimed in
advance for the French by Renan. The Germans could
foresee that one would wage this war against them some day. It
was their obligation to arm for it. What they have done to
fulfill this obligation, is called among their opponents the
cultivation of their militarism.
What the Germans have to accomplish, for their own sake, and in
order to fulfill the tasks laid upon them by world-historical
necessities, would have been possible for them to accomplish
without this war, if these accomplishments were just as
acceptable to others as they are
n e c e s s a r y
to them. It did not at all depend on the Germans how the other
peoples took the fulfillment of the world-historical tasks that
in recent time in the realm of material culture added
themselves for the Germans to their tasks existing earlier. In
the power that, working only out of itself, establishes the
position of their material cultural accomplishments, the
Germans were able to place the trust they could gain from the
way their work of spirit has been received by the peoples. If
one looks at the German manner, one notices that nothing is
inherent in it that would have made it necessary for the German
to establish in any other way before the world the present work
he has to accomplish than has happened with his purely
spiritual accomplishments.
It
is not necessary that the German make the attempt himself to
characterize the significance for mankind of the German
quality of spirit and accomplishment of spirit. If he
wants to record verdicts as to what significance this quality
and accomplishment have for mankind outside of the German area,
he can seek the answers among this mankind outside of the
German area. One will be permitted to listen to the words of a
personality who belongs to the leading ones in the region of the
English language, to the words of the great speaker of America,
Ralph Waldo Emerson.
In his contemplation on Goethe,
he gives a characterization of the German quality of
spirit and accomplishment of spirit in their relationship
to the world's formative cultural education. [Emerson's
sentences are quoted here according to the translation by
Herman Grimm. Cf. his book: Fifteen Essays, Third
Installment.] He says: “What distinguishes Goethe
for French and English readers is a property which he shares
with his nation, — a habitual reference to interior
truth. In England and in America there is a respect for talent;
and, if it is exerted in support of any ascertained or
intelligible interest or party, or in regular opposition to
any, the public is satisfied. In France there is even a greater
delight in intellectual brilliancy for its own sake. And in all
these countries, men of talent write from talent. It is enough
if the understanding is occupied, the taste propitiated,
— so many columns, so many hours, filled in a
lively and creditable way. The German intellect wants the
French sprightliness, the fine practical understanding of the
English, and the American adventure; but it has a certain
probity, which never rests in a superficial performance, but
asks steadily, To what end? A German public asks for a
controlling sincerity. Here is activity of thought; but what is
it for? What does the man mean? Whence, whence all these
thoughts?” And in another pas sage of this
contemplation on Goethe, Emerson molds the words: The
“earnest ness enables them — Emerson means
men educated in Germany — to out-see men of much more
talent. Hence almost all the valuable distinctions which are
current in higher conversation have been derived to us from
Germany. But whilst men distinguished for wit and learning, in
England and France, adopt their study and their side with a
certain levity, and are not understood to be very deeply
engaged, from grounds of character, to the topic or the part
they espouse, — Goethe, the head and body of the German
nation, does not speak from talent, but the truth shines
through. He is very wise, though his talent often veils his
wisdom. However excellent his sentence is, he has somewhat
better in view. He has the formidable independence which
converse with truth gives. Hear you, or forbear, his fact
abides.”
A
few more thoughts of Emerson's shall be added that will quite
certainly be allowed to stand here; after all, an
English-American spoke them about the Germans. “The
Germans think for Europe ... The English want the faculty of
grouping men in natural classes by an insight of general laws ...
The English cannot interpret the German mind.”
Emerson was able to know what infusion German spiritual work is
capable of giving to mankind.
In
the sentences quoted, Emerson speaks of the “French
sprightliness,” and of the “fine practical
understanding of the English.” If one wanted to continue
in his sense with regard to the Russians, one could perhaps
say: the German lacks the impulse of the Russians to seek a
mystical power for all their life expressions, even the
practical, by which they are justified.
And
in these relationships of the spirits of these peoples lies
something quite similar to the military conflicts presently in
effect. In the driving force that from the side of the French
led to the war with Germany, their temperament is at work, what
Emerson means by their sprightliness is at work. In this
temperament lies the mysterious force that so bubbles
over when it utters itself in Renan's words: “hatred unto
death, preparations without rest, alliance with anyone
convenient.” That before the war France stood armed with
a military almost equal to Germany's in absolute terms, but in
relation to its population even more than one and a half times
as large, is a result of this mysterious force, over which
result, the cliché about “German militarism”
is to be drawn as a concealing veil. — In Russia's
will to war, the mystical belief is at work, even where it
finds only an instinctive expression. To characterize the
conflicts effective to day between French and Russians on
the one hand and Germans on the other hand, one will have to
observe the moods of the souls. — The military
conflict between British and Germans, by contrast, is
such that the Germans see themselves facing only “fine
practical” driving forces. The ideal of English
policy is, in keeping with the essential being of the
country, entirely oriented toward practical goals. Be it
emphasized: in keeping with the essential being of the country.
What its inhabitants reveal of this essential being, say in
their behavior, is itself a working of this essential being,
but not the basis of the English political ideal. Activity in
the sense of this ideal has engendered in the Briton the habit
of counting as guideline for this activity what seems to him to
correspond to personal interests of life. It does not
contradict the presence of such a guideline that it asserts
itself in the shared life of society as a definite rule, which
one strictly obeys if one wants to have manners. It also does
not contradict it that one holds the guideline to be
something quite other than it is.
All of this holds good only for the
Briton insofar as he is integrated into the world of his
political ideal. And by this, a military conflict is created
between England and Germany.
That one day the time must come when on soul territory, the
world view of the German essential being, aiming as it does for
the spiritual, will have to achieve its world validity by
conquest — obviously, only by a battle of spirits —
over against the one that has its representatives out of the
English essential being in Mill, Spencer, the pragmatist
Schiller, in Locke and Huxley, among others: the fact of the
present war can be an admonition for this. But this has nothing
directly to do with this war.
Goethe had in mind the guideline characterized for England's
political ideal when he, who counted Shakespeare among the
spirits that exerted the greatest influence on him, spoke the
words: “But while the Germans torture themselves solving
philosophical problems, the English with their great practical
mind laugh at us, and win the world. Everyman knows their
declamations against the slave trade, and while they would
have us believe
what humane principles lie at the basis of such a
policy, it now comes out that the true motive is a real object,
without which the English, as is known, never do so, and which
one should have known.” — About Byron, who became
his model for Euphorion in the Second Part of Faust,
Goethe says: “Byron is to be regarded as man, as
Englishman, and as patriot. His good qualities are to be
derived primarily from the man; his bad ones, that he was an
Englishman. All Englishmen are as such without real reflection;
distraction and partisan spirit do not allow them to reach any
calm formative training. But they are great as practical
men.”
These Goethean verdicts, too, touch not the Englishman as such,
but only what reveals itself as “total essential being
England” when this total essential being reveals
itself as bearer of its political ideal.
The
political ideal mentioned has developed the habit of
establishing as great a space of the earth as possible for
England's use, in keeping with the guideline characterized.
Regarding this space, England appears like a person
establishing his house at his pleasure, and growing
accustomed to bar his neighbors as well from doing anything
that makes the inhabitability of the house less pleasant than
one wishes.
England believed the habit of being able to live on in this
fashion was threatened by the development that Germany
n e c e s s a r i l y
had to strive for in most recent time.
Hence it is understandable that it did not want to allow a
military conflict to arise between Russia-France on the one
hand and Germany-Austria on the other without doing everything
that could contribute to eliminating the nightmare of
threat caused to it by Germany's cultural work. That, how
ever, was to join Germany's opponents. A purely political
“fine practical under standing” calculated
what danger could arise for England from a Germany
victorious against Russia and France. — This
calculating has as little to do with a merely moral indignation
over the “violation of Belgian neutrality” as it
has much to do with the “fine practical
understanding,” which sees the Germans in England's
circle of interests when they enter Belgium.
What this “fine practical” direction of will in
connection with other forces directed against Germany has to
bring into operation in the course of time, was able to show
itself, for a German sensing, when the question was asked: how
did England's political ideal always work when a European land
power had to find that the world-historical conditions demanded
that it expand its activity over the seas? One needed only to
look at what this political ideal had done regarding Spain and
Portugal, Holland, France, when these unfolded their activity
at sea. And one could remember that this political ideal always
“had a fine understanding for the practical,”
and that it knew how to calculate how the European
directions of will that were directed against the
countries in which a young maritime activity was unfolding were
to be brought into a relationship of forces in such a way that
a prospect opened up that England would be freed of its
competitor.
What the People of Germany had to sense regarding the European
situation before the war, emerges upon observation of the
forces directed upon this people from the periphery. From
England, the “fine practical” “ideal”
of this country. From Russia, directions of will that opposed
the tasks that had emerged for Germany and Austria-Hungary for
“Europe's Middle.” From France, folk forces whose
being was not to be sensed otherwise for the German than in the
manner which Moltke, in reference to France's relationship to
Germany, once molded into the words: “Napoleon was a
passing phenomenon. France remained. We already had to do
with France centuries ago, we shall still have to do with it in
centuries. ... the younger generation in France is raised in
the belief that it has a sacred right to the Rhine, and that it
has the mission of making it the border of France at the first
opportunity. The Rhine border must become a truth, that is the
theme for the future of France.”
In
the face of these three directions of will, world-historical
necessity had forged together Germany and Austria-Hungary into
“Europe's Middle.” There have always been people
grown together with this European middle who sensed how tasks
will grow up for this European middle that will reveal
themselves to them as tasks to be solved in common by the
peoples of this middle. Like a representative of such
people, one long dead shall be remembered here. One who bore
the ideals of “Europe's Middle” deep in his soul,
in which they were warmed by the power of Goethe, from which he
let his whole world conception and the inmost impulses of his
life be carried. It is the Austrian researcher of
literature and language, Karl Julius Schröer. A man
who was all too little known and appreciated by his
contemporaries in his being and significance. The writer of
these contemplations counts him among those personalities to
whom he owes immeasurable thanks in life. Schröer wrote
down in his book on German Poetry in the year 1875, as
written trace of the sensations that the events of 1870/1871
had stirred for the forming of an ideal of “Europe's
Middle,” the words: “We in Austria see ourselves,
just at this significant turning point, in a peculiar
situation. Though the free movement of our life of state has
cleared away the wall of separation that parted us from
Germany up to a short time ago, though we are now given the
means of working our way upward to a common cultural life with
the other Germans, yet just now it has come to pass that we
were not to participate in a great act of our people. ...
A wall of separation could not arise through this in the German
life of the spirit. Its roots are not of a political but of a
culture-historical nature. We want to keep our eyes on this
untearable unity of the German life of the spirit ... in the
German Empire may they appreciate and honor our difficult
cultural task, and as for the past, not blame us for what is
our fate, not our fault.” Out of what sensations would a
soul who so feels speak, if he still dwelt among the living,
and beheld how the Austrian in full unity with the German of
Germany is fulfilling an “act of his people!”
“Europe's Middle” is formed by “fate;”
the souls that feel themselves as belonging to this middle with
an engagement full of understanding place it in the
responsibility of the spirit of history to judge what in the
past — and what also in the present and future is its
“fate, not its fault.”
And
whoever wants to assess the understanding which the ideas of a
common direction of will of the “Middle of Europe”
have found abroad in Hungary, let him read voices from
Hungary such as one is to be found in the article about
“The Genesis of the Defensive Alliance,” by Emerich
von Halasz, in the March, 1911 issue of Young Hungary.
In it are the words: “If we ... consider that Andrassy
stepped back from directing affairs more than thirty, and
Bismarck more than twenty-one years ago, and this great work of
peace stands ever yet in full power, and promises to have still
further a long duration: then surely we need not surrender to a
gloomy pessimism ... Bismarck and Andrassy with united force
found an impressive solution to the middle-European problem,
and thereby fulfilled a civilizational work that hopefully will
outlast several generations ... In the history of
alliances we seek in vain for a formation of such
duration and of such mighty conception.”
When the characterized directions of willing, turned against
“Europe's Middle,” had joined for common pressure,
it was inevitable that this “pressure” determined
the sensations that formed within the middle-European peoples
concerning the course that world events were taking. And
when the facts of the summer of 1914 came about, they found
Europe in a world-historical situation in which the forces
operative in the life of peoples enter actively into the course
of events in such a way that they remove the decision about
what is to happen from the realm of ordinary human assessment,
and place it into that of a higher order, an order by which
world-historical necessity takes effect within the course of
human development. Whoever senses the essential being of such
world-moments, also lifts his judgment out of the region in
which questions nest of the type, what would have happened if
in an hour heavy with destiny this or that proposal of this or
that personality had had more effect than was the case? In
moments of world-historical turnings, men experience in their
decisions forces about which one only judges aright if one
endeavors — remember the words of
Emerson
— not
only to “see the particular” but to “conceive
of” mankind “as a whole by higher laws.” How
should it be permissible to judge by the laws of ordinary
life the decisions of men that cannot be made out of these
laws, because in them the spirit is at work who can be beheld
only in the
w o r l d - h i s t o r i c a l
necessities.
— Natural laws belong to the natural order; above them
stand the laws that belong to the order of ordinary human
living-together; and above them stand the spiritual-operative
laws of world-historical becoming, which belong to yet
another order, the one through which men and peoples
solve tasks and go through developments that lie outside the
realm of ordinary human living together.
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