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Rudolf Steiner e.Lib
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Basic Issues of the Social Question
Rudolf Steiner e.Lib Document
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Basic Issues of the Social Question
Basic Issues: Chapter Four: International Relations Between Social Organisms
On-line since: 13th July, 2002
International Relations Between Social Organisms
The internal formation of the healthy social organism being triformed.
Each of the three sectors will have an independent relation to the
corresponding sector of another social organism. Economic relations
between countries will exist without being directly influenced by the
relations between their respective rights-states.* Conversely, the
relations between rights-states will develop, within certain limits,
completely independent of economic relations. Through this
independence of development, the relations will act upon each other in
a conciliatory way in cases of conflict. The resulting complex of
mutual interests among the individual social organisms will make
national frontiers seem inconsequential for human coexistence.
* To object that rights and economic relations really constitute a
whole and cannot be separated is to misunderstand what is meant here
concerning social formation. In the overall commercial process both
kinds of relation of course act as a whole. There is, however, a
difference if rights are established according to economic
requirements, or if they are established according to the elementary
sense of human rights and then are applied to economic affairs.
The spiritual/cultural organizations of the various countries will be
able to enter into mutual relations which derive exclusively from the
common spiritual life of mankind. The self-sustaining spiritual
sector, independent of the state, will develop conditions which are
impossible to attain when recognition of spiritual activities is
dependent on the rights-state instead of the spiritual organism's
administration. In this respect there is no difference between
scientific activities, which are obviously international, and other
spiritual activities. A people's own language and everything related
to it also constitute a spiritual area. National awareness itself
belongs to this area. The people of one language region do not come
into unnatural conflict with the people of another if political
organizations and economic power are not used to assert their
cultures. Should one people's culture have a greater capability for
expansion and spiritual productivity than another, then its expansion
will be justified and will come about peacefully if its only means of
doing so are the institutions which depend on the spiritual organism.
At the present time, the strongest opposition to a threefold social
organism will come from the communities which have developed from
common language and culture. This opposition must give way before the
goal which the times have set and of which mankind as a whole must
become increasingly aware. Mankind will perceive that each of its
parts can achieve a dignified existence only if all the parts are
vigorously allied amongst themselves. Ethnic affinities, together with
other natural impulses, are the historic cause of the formation of
political and economic communities.
However, the forces by means of which the various peoples grow must
develop with a reciprocity which is not hampered by relations between
political states and economic cooperatives. This will be achieved when
the ethnic communities have implemented their social triformation to
the extent that each of the sectors can cultivate independent
relations with other social organisms.
Diversified relations are therewith established between peoples,
states and economic bodies which ally all the parts of mankind so that
each, in its own interest, is sensitive to the life of the others. A
league of nations arises from impulses corresponding to reality.
[Note 7]
It will not need to be installed because of one-sided
political considerations.*
* To see utopias in these ideas is to ignore the fact that
the realities of life are striving toward just such arrangements, and
that harm results because such arrangements are lacking.
Of special significance is the fact that the social goals described
here, although valid for humanity in general, can be realized by each
individual social organism regardless of other countries' initial
attitudes. Should a social organism form itself according to the three
natural sectors, the representatives of each sector could enter into
international relations with others, even if these others have not yet
adopted the same forms. Those who lead the way to these forms are
working for a common goal of humanity. What must be accomplished is
far more likely to come about on the strength of human impulses which
have their roots in life, than through decisions and agreements made
at congresses and the like. The thoughts which underlie these goals
are based on reality; they are to be pursued in all human communities.
Whoever has followed the political events of the last decades from the
point of view represented here, will have perceived how the various
states, with their merged spiritual, rights and economic sectors, were
approaching catastrophe in international relations. At the same time
however, he could also see that forces of a contrary nature were
arising as unconscious human impulses and pointing the way toward the
triformation. This will be the remedy for the shock caused by
fanaticism for uniform statism. But the competent leaders of
humanity were not able to see what had long since been in
preparation. In the spring and early summer of 1914 one could still
hear statesmen saying that peace in Europe, as far as
could be humanly foreseen, was secure thanks to the efforts of
governments. These statesmen had no idea that their words
and deeds no longer had any relation whatsoever to the real course of
events. But they were the experts. Those who had been
developing contrary views during the last decades, such as those
expressed by the author months before the outbreak of war and,
finally, to a small audience in Vienna (a larger audience would only
have been derisive) were considered to be eccentric.
Words to the following effect concerning the immediate dangers were
spoken: Today's prevalent tendencies will continue to gather
momentum until they finally destroy themselves. Whoever observes
society with spiritual insight sees a terrible disposition to social
cancerous growths everywhere. This is cause for great concern. It is
so terrible and distressing that even if a person could otherwise
suppress all enthusiasm for the knowledge of life's events obtainable
through a science which recognizes the spirit, he would still feel
obliged to speak, to cry out to the world about the remedy. If the
social organism continues to develop as it has until now, injuries to
culture will occur which are to this organism what cancer is to the
human physical organism. But the views of the ruling circles,
based on just such undercurrents which they refused to recognize, led
them to take measures better left undone and to take none which could
have instilled mutual trust among the members of the various human
communities.
Whoever believes that social exigencies played no direct role as a
cause of the present world catastrophe, should consider what would
have become of the political impulses of those states heading for war
had their statesmen taken these exigencies seriously and
acted upon them. They would then not have created the inflammable
conditions which eventually led to an explosion. If, during the past
decades, one had observed the cancer which has grown into the
relations between states as the result of the ruling circles' social
conduct, one could understand how, as early as 1888, a personage of
general human spiritual interests was obliged to state the following
in view of how social will was being expressed in these ruling
circles: The goal is to turn the whole of humanity into an
empire of brothers who, following only the noblest of motives, stride
forward in unison. Whoever follows history on the map of Europe,
however, can easily believe that what the immediate future holds in
store is a general mass slaughter; and only the thought that a
way to the true goodness of human life must be found can
maintain a sense of human dignity. This thought is one which
does not seem to coincide with our and our neighbours' enormous
war-like preparations; it is one in which I, nevertheless, believe,
and which must enlighten us, unless we prefer to simply do away with
human life by common consent and designate an official suicide
day. (Herman Grimm, 1888, on page 46 of his book: Fifteen Essays
The Last Five Years). What were these war-like
preparations but measures enacted by people who wanted to
maintain the uniform state structure in spite of the fact that this
form has become contradictory to the fundamentals of healthy
cooperation between peoples? Such healthy cooperation could, however,
be accomplished by that social organism which is based on the
necessities of the times.
The Austro-Hungarian state structure had been in need of a
reorganization for more than half a century.
[Note 8]
Its spiritual life, with roots in a multiplicity of ethnic
communities, required the development of a form for which the obsolete
uniform state was a hindrance. The Serbo-Austrian conflict, which was
the starting-point of the world-war catastrophe, is the most valid
proof that, as of a certain time, the political borders of this
uniform state should not have constituted the borders for its ethnic
life as well.
[Note 9]
Had the possibility existed for a self-sustaining spiritual life,
independent of the political state and its borders, to develop beyond
these borders in harmony with the goals of the ethnic groups, then the
conflict, which had its roots in the spiritual sector, would not have
exploded in a political catastrophe. Development in this direction
seemed completely impossible, if not outright nonsensical, to those in
Austro-Hungary who imagined that their thinking was
statesman-like. Their thought-habits could not conceive of
any other possibility but that the state borders must coincide with
national communities. An understanding of the fact that spiritual
organizations, including schools and other branches of spiritual life,
could be established without regard to state borders was contrary to
their thought-habits. Nevertheless, this unthinkable
arrangement constitutes the requirement of modern times for
international relations. The practical thinker should not let himself
be restrained by the seemingly impossible, and believe that
arrangements which satisfy this requirement would meet with
insurmountable difficulties; he should rather direct his efforts
toward overcoming these difficulties. Instead of bringing the
statesmanlike thinking into agreement with the
requirements of the times, efforts were made to sustain the uniform
state in opposition to these requirements. This state therefore took
on an increasingly impossible structure. By the second decade of the
twentieth century, it was unable to preserve itself in the old form
and had the choice of awaiting dissolution or outwardly maintaining
the inwardly impossible by means of the force which manifested itself
in the war. The Austro-Hungarian statesmen had only two
choices in 1914: either to direct their efforts toward achieving the
conditions necessary for a healthy social organism, and inform the
world of their purpose, thereby awakening new confidence, or they had
to unleash a war in order to maintain the old structure. Only by
considering the events of 1914 with this background in mind can one
judge the question of guilt fairly. Through the participation of many
ethnic groups in its state structure, Austro-Hungary's historical
mission may well have been above all to develop a healthy social
organism. This mission was not recognized. It was this sin against the
spirit of historical evolution that drove Austro-Hungary to war.
And the German Empire?
[Note 10]
It was founded at a time when the modern requirements for a healthy
social organism were striving for recognition. This recognition could
have given the Empire's existence its historical justification. Social
impulses were concentrated in this central European Empire as though
historically predestined to live themselves out within its borders.
Social thinking arose in many places, but in the German Empire it took
a special form which indicated where it was heading. This should have
supplied the Empire with a purpose. This should have shown its
administrators where its mission lay. The justification for this
Empire could have been contained in a modern compatibility of nations,
had the newly-created Empire been given a purpose which coincided with
the forces of history. Instead of rising to the greatness of this
mission, those responsible remained at the level of social
reforms corresponding to the needs of the moment, and were happy
when these reforms were admired abroad.
[Note 11]
At the same time they were moving toward an external power structure
based on forms deriving from the most antiquated concepts about the
power and splendour of states. An empire was built which, like the
Austro-Hungarian state structure, contradicted the forces present in
the various ethnic communities at that historic moment. The
administrators of this empire saw nothing of these forces. The state
structure which they had in mind could only be based on military
power. The requirements of modern history would have been satisfied by
the implementation of the impulse for a healthy social organism. If
this had been done, relations between nations would have been
different in 1914. Because of their lack of understanding of modern
requirements in ethnic relations, German policy had reached the
zero-point in 1914 as far as possibilities for further action were
concerned. During the preceding decades they had understood nothing of
what should have been done, and German policy had been occupied with
every possibility that had no relation to modern evolutionary forces,
and therefore had to collapse like a house of cards due to its lack of
content.
A true picture of the historic events surrounding the German Empire's
tragic destiny would emerge if an examination were made of the
decisive events in Berlin at the end of July and August 1, 1914, and
the facts presented truthfully to the world.
[Note 12]
Little is known of these events, either in Germany or abroad. Whoever
is familiar with them knows that German policy at that time was
comparable to a house of cards, and because of its arrival at a
zero-point of activity, the decision as to whether and how the war was
to begin had to be left to the military. The responsible military
authorities at that time could not, from the military view-point, have
acted in any other way than they did, because from this viewpoint the
situation could only be seen as they saw it for outside the
military sector things had come to the point where action was no
longer possible. All this would emerge as historical fact if someone
were to occupy himself with bringing to light the events which took
place in Berlin at the end of July and the beginning of August,
namely, everything which occurred on August 1, and July 31. The
illusion persists that an insight into these events would not be
particularly enlightening if one is familiar with the events which led
up to this time. It is not possible, however, to discuss the
guilt question without this insight. Certainly one may
have knowledge through other means of the causes which were long
present; but the insight shows how these causes acted on events.
The concepts which at that time drove Germany's leaders to war
continued their ruinous work. They became the national sentiment. They
prevented those in power from developing the necessary insight through
the bitter experience of these last terrible years. The author,
wishing to take advantage of the receptivity which might have resulted
from this experience, attempted to make known during the war
which he considered to be the most suitable time the concepts
of the healthy social organism and its consequences for German policy
to personages in Germany and Austria whose influence could still have
been brought to bear in furthering these impulses.
[Note 13]
Those persons who honestly had the German people's destiny at heart
participated in the attempt to gain a hearing for these ideas. But the
attempt was futile. The thought-habits resisted such impulses which,
to the military mentality, appeared unworkable. Separation of
church and school: yes, that would be something; but they got no
further. The thoughts of the statesman-like thinkers had
long been running along the same track, and more drastic measures were
beyond them. Well-meaning people suggested that I make these ideas
public. This was most unsuitable advice at the time. What good could
it have done to have these ideas, among so many others, and coming
from a private individual, disseminated in the field of
literature. It is in the nature of these impulses that
they could only have been influential, at that time, if they had come
from the appropriate places. Had the sense of these impulses been
favourably proclaimed from the right quarters, the peoples of central
Europe would have realized that here is something which coincides with
their more or less conscious desires. And the Russian peoples in the
east would surely have been sympathetic to these impulses as an
alternative to czarism. This can only be denied by someone who has no
feeling for the receptivity of the East-European intellect
fresh as it still was for healthy social ideas. Instead of a
pronouncement of such ideas, however, came Brest-Litovsk.
[Note 14]
That military thinking could not avert the catastrophe in central and
eastern Europe was apparent to all but the military minds. The cause
of the German people's misfortune was unwillingness to see that the
catastrophe was unavoidable. Nobody wanted to believe that there was
no sense of historic necessity in the places where decisions were
being made. Whoever knew something of these necessities also realized
that there were personages among the English-speaking peoples who
understood the forces at work in the peoples of central and eastern
Europe. They were convinced that a situation was brewing which must
result in mighty social upheavals but only in central and
eastern Europe, for it was felt that there was not yet either a
historical necessity or a possibility for such upheavals in the
English-speaking world. Policy was formulated accordingly. This was
not understood in central and eastern Europe, and policy was
formulated in such a way that it had to collapse like a house of
cards. The only effective policy would have been one based on an
insight into the English-speaking world's liberal recognition of
historical necessities from an English point of view of course.
But the diplomats would have found a suggestion for such a
policy highly superfluous.
Instead of such a policy, which could have been very advantageous for
central and eastern Europe before the catastrophe of war overtook it,
they continued in the same old diplomatic rut in spite of the liberal
orientation of English policy. Furthermore, during the horrors of war
they did not learn from bitter experience that the mission presented
to the world in political declarations from America should be
countered by one born of the vital forces of Europe. An understanding
could have been reached between the mission presented by Woodrow
Wilson from the American point of view, and one heard over the thunder
of cannons as a European spiritual impulse. Any other talk of an
understanding rang hollow in view of the historical necessities.
But a sense of mission based on modern humanity's true needs was
lacking in those responsible for the German empire's administration.
Therefore, what the autumn of 1918 brought was inevitable. The
collapse of military power was accompanied by a spiritual
capitulation. Instead of exerting European will at that time in an
attempt to assert the German people's spiritual impulses, came the
simple submission to Wilson's fourteen points.
[Note 15]
Wilson was confronted with a Germany which had nothing to say for
itself. Whatever Wilson may think about his own fourteen points, he
can only help Germany to fulfil what the country itself wills. Surely
he must have expected a demonstration of this desire. But to the
nullity of German policy at the beginning of the war was added the
nullity of 1918; the terrible spiritual capitulation came, brought on
by a man in whom many in the German lands had placed something like a
last hope.
Lack of faith in insights derived from historically active forces;
unwillingness to recognize knowledge derived from spiritually related
impulses: this was what produced central Europe's situation. Now a new
situation has been created by the catastrophe of war. It can be
characterized by the idea of humanity's social impulses as it has been
interpreted in this book. These social impulses speak a language which
confronts the whole civilized world with a mission. Shall thinking
about what must now come about in respect of the social question reach
the same zero-point as did central European policy in respect of its
mission in 1914? Countries which were able to remain aloof from the
events of that time may not do so as far as the social movement is
concerned. In this question there should be no political opponents and
no neutrals; there should only be one mankind, working together, which
is able to read the signs of the times and act in accordance with
them.
The intentions described in this book make it possible to understand
why the appeal To the German People and the Civilized
World, which is reproduced in the following chapter, was
formulated by the author some time ago and communicated to the world
especially to the peoples of central Europe by a
committee which sympathized with its aims. The present situation is
different from the one prevalent at the time in which it was
communicated to relatively few. At that time a wider propagation would
have been considered literature. Today the public must
bring to it what it could not have brought a short time ago:
understanding men and women who want to work for what it advocates
if it is worth being understood and being put into practice.
What should come about now is only possible through the activity of
such people.
Last Modified: 02-Nov-2024
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