Chapter Four
International
Relations Between Social Organisms
The internal formation of the
healthy social organism being threefold, each of the three sectors will
have an independent relation to the corresponding sector of another
social organism. Economic relations between countries will exist
without being directly influenced by the relations between their
respective rights-states. Conversely, the relations between
rights-states will develop, within certain limits, completely
independent of economic relations. Through this independence of
development, the relations will act upon each other in a conciliatory
way in cases of conflict. The resulting complex of mutual interests
among the individual social organisms will make national frontiers seem
inconsequential for human coexistence.
The spiritual/cultural
organizations of the various countries will be able to enter into
mutual relations which derive exclusively from the common spiritual
life of humanity. The self-sustaining spiritual sector, independent of
the state, will develop conditions which are impossible to attain when
recognition of spiritual activities is dependent on the rights-state
instead of the spiritual organism's administration. In this respect
there is no difference between scientific activities, which are
obviously international, and other spiritual activities. A people's own
language, and everything related to it, also constitutes a spiritual
area. National awareness itself belongs to this area. The people of one
language region do not come into unnatural conflict with the people of
another if political organizations and economic power are not used to
assert their cultures. Should one people's culture have a greater
capability for expansion and spiritual productivity than another, then
its expansion will be justified and will come about peacefully if its
only means of doing so are the institutions which depend on the
spiritual organism.
At the present time, the strongest
opposition to a threefold social organism will come from the
communities which have developed from common language and culture. This
opposition must give way before the goal which the times have set and
of which humanity as a whole must become increasingly aware. Mankind
will perceive that each of its parts can achieve a dignified existence
only if all the parts are vigorously allied among themselves. Ethnic
affinities, together with other natural impulses, are the historic
cause of the formation of political and economic
communities.
However, the forces by means of
which the various peoples grow must develop with a reciprocity which is
not hampered by relations between political states and economic
cooperatives. This will be achieved when the ethnic communities have
implemented their social threefold formation to the extent that each of
the sectors can cultivate independent relations with other social
organisms.
Diversified relations are therewith
established between peoples, states and economic bodies which unite all
the parts of humanity so that each is sensitive to the life of the
others. A league of nations arises from impulses corresponding to
reality. [Reference is to the organization of
this name established by the victorious allies on 28 July 1919, mostly
at the initiative of President Wilson. It had no sooner been created
than it suffered an almost mortal blow when the United States Congress
rejected it.] It will not
need to be installed because of one-sided political
considerations.
Of special significance is the fact
that the social goals described here, although valid for humanity in
general, can be realized by each individual social organism regardless
of other countries' initial attitudes. Should a social organism be
formed according to the three natural sectors, the representatives of
each sector could enter into international relations with others, even
if these others have not yet adopted the same forms. Those who lead the
way to these forms are working for a common goal of humanity. What must
be accomplished is far more likely to come about on the strength of
human impulses which have their roots in life, than through decisions
and agreements made at congresses and the like. The thoughts which
underlie these goals are based on reality; they are to be pursued in
all human communities.
Whoever has followed the political
events of the last decades from the point of view represented here,
will have perceived how the various states, with their merged
spiritual, rights and economic sectors, were approaching catastrophe in
international relations. At the same time, however, he could also see
that forces of a contrary nature were arising as unconscious human
impulses and pointing the way toward the threefold formation. This will
be the remedy for the shock caused by fanaticism for uniform statism.
But the so-called ‘competent leaders of humanity’ were not able to see
what had long since been in preparation. In the spring and early summer
of 1914, one could still hear statesmen saying that peace in Europe, as
far as could be humanly foreseen, was secure thanks to the efforts of
governments. These ‘statesmen’ had no idea that their words and deeds
no longer had any relation whatsoever to the real course of events. But
they were the experts. Those who had been developing contrary views
during the last decades, such as those expressed by the author months
before the outbreak of war and, finally, to a small audience in Vienna
(a larger audience would only have been derisive) were considered to be
eccentric.
Words to the following effect
concerning the immediate dangers were spoken: ‘Today's prevalent
tendencies will continue to gather momentum until they finally destroy
themselves. Whoever observes society with spiritual insight sees a
terrible disposition to social cancerous growths everywhere. This is
cause for great concern. It is so terrible and distressing that even if
a person could otherwise suppress all enthusiasm for the knowledge of
life's events obtainable through a science which recognizes the spirit,
he would still feel obliged to speak, to cry out to the world about the
remedy. If the social organism continues to develop as it has until
now, injuries to culture will occur which are to this organism what
cancer is to the human physical organism.’ But the views of the ruling
circles, based on just such undercurrents which they refused to
recognize, led them to take measures better left undone and to take
none which could have instilled mutual trust among the members of the
various human communities.
Whoever believes that social
exigencies played no direct role as a cause of the present world
catastrophe, should consider what would have become of the political
impulses of those states heading for war had their statesmen taken
these exigencies seriously and acted upon them. They would then not
have created the inflammable conditions which eventually led to an
explosion. If, during the past decades, one had observed the cancer
which had grown into the relations between states as the result of the
ruling circles' social conduct, one could understand how, as early as
1888, a personage of general human spiritual interests was obliged to
state the following in view of how social will was being expressed in
these ruling circles: ‘The goal is to turn the whole of humanity into
an empire of brothers who, following only the noblest of motives,
stride forward in unison. Whoever follows history on the map of Europe,
however, can easily believe that what the immediate future holds in
store is a general mass slaughter’; and only the thought that a ‘way to
the true goodness of human life’ must be found can maintain a sense of
human dignity. This thought is one ‘which does not seem to coincide
with our and our neighbors' enormous war-like preparations; it is one
in which I, nevertheless, believe, and which must enlighten us, unless
we prefer to simply do away with human life by common consent and
designate an official suicide day.’ (Herman Grimm, 1888, on page 46 of
his book: Fifteen Essays — The Last Five Years). What were these
‘war-like preparations’ but measures enacted by people who wanted to
maintain the uniform state structure in spite of the fact that this
form had become contradictory to the fundamentals of healthy
cooperation between peoples? Such healthy cooperation could, however,
be accomplished by that social organism which is based on the
necessities of the times.
The Austria-Hungarian state
structure had been in need of a reorganization for more than half a
century. [An American journalist-historian has
since seen it this way. ‘The Danube monarchy was dying of indigestion.
For centuries a minority of German-Austrians had ruled over the
polyglot empire of a dozen nationalities and stamped their language and
culture on it. But since 1848 their hold had been weakening. The
minorities could not be digested. Austria was not a melting pot. In the
1860s the Italians had broken away and in 1867 the Hungarians had won
equality with the Germans under the so-called Dual Monarchy. Now, as
the twentieth century began, the various Slav peoples — the Czechs, the
Slovaks, the Serbs, the Croats and the others — were demanding equality
and at least national autonomy. Austrian politics had become dominated
by the bitter quarrel of the nationalities. But this was not all. There
was social revolt too and this often transcended the racial struggle
...‘ William L. Shirer,The Rise and Fall of
the Third Reich,
Simon & Schuster, New York, 1960.]
Its spiritual life, with roots in a
multiplicity of ethnic communities, required the development of a form
for which the obsolete uniform state was a hindrance. The
Serbo-Austrian conflict, which was the starting-point of the world-war
catastrophe, is the most valid proof that, as of a certain time, the
political borders of this uniform state should not have constituted the
borders for its ethnic life as well. [The
Austrian Grand Duke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated on
28 June 1914 in Sarajevo by members of a Serbian secret society. The
assassination was the outward event which triggered the war.]
Had the possibility existed for a
self-sustaining spiritual life, independent of the political state and
its borders, to develop beyond these borders in harmony with the goals
of the ethnic groups, then the conflict, which had its roots in the
spiritual sector, would not have exploded in a political catastrophe.
Development in this direction seemed completely impossible, if not
outright nonsensical, to those in Austria-Hungary who imagined that
their thinking was ‘statesman-like.’ Their thought-habits could not
conceive of any other possibility but that the state borders must
coincide with national communities. An understanding of the fact that
spiritual organizations, including schools and other branches of
spiritual life, could be established without regard to state borders
was contrary to their thinking. Nevertheless, this ‘unthinkable’
arrangement constitutes the requirement of modern times for
international relations. The practical thinker should not let himself
be restrained by the seemingly impossible and believe that arrangements
which satisfy this requirement would meet with insurmountable
difficulties; he should rather direct his efforts toward overcoming
these difficulties. Instead of bringing the ‘statesmanlike’ thinking
into agreement with the requirements of the times, efforts were made to
sustain the uniform state in opposition to these requirements. This
state therefore took on an increasingly impossible structure. By the
second decade of the twentieth century, it was unable to preserve
itself in the old form and had the choice of awaiting dissolution or
outwardly maintaining the inwardly impossible by means of the force
which manifested itself in the war. The Austria-Hungarian ‘statesmen’
had only two choices in 1914: either to direct their efforts toward
achieving the conditions necessary for a healthy social organism, and
inform the world of their purpose, thereby awakening new confidence, or
they had to unleash a war in order to maintain the old structure. Only
by considering the events of 1914 with this background in mind can one
judge the question of guilt fairly. Through the participation of many
ethnic groups in its state structure, Austria-Hungary’s historical
mission may well have been above all to develop a healthy social
organism. This mission was not recognized. It was this sin against the
spirit of historical evolution that drove Austria-Hungary to
war.
And the German
Empire? [The ‘second’ German Empire was founded
on 18 January 1871 through the efforts of its chancellor, Otto von
Bismarck. On that date, King Wilhelm I of Prussia was proclaimed
Emperor of Germany in the Hall of Mirrors at
Versailles.] It was
founded at a time when the modern requirements for a healthy social
organism were striving for recognition. This recognition could have
given the Empire's existence its historical justification. Social
impulses were concentrated in this central European Empire as though
historically predestined to live themselves out within its borders.
Social thinking arose in many places, but in the German Empire it took
a special form which indicated where it was heading. This should have
supplied the Empire with a purpose. This should have shown its
administrators where its mission lay. The justification for this Empire
could have been contained in a modern compatibility of nations
[ethnicities], had the newly-created Empire been given a purpose which
coincided with the forces of history. Instead of rising to the
greatness of this mission, those responsible remained at the level of
social reforms corresponding to the needs of the moment, and were happy
when these reforms were admired abroad. [During
the period 1883 to 1889 Bismarck had enacted various such reforms,
which went far beyond anything known at that time in other countries.
They included compulsory insurance for old-age sickness, accidents and
incapacity and they were operated by the state but financed by
employees and employers. Such reforms had the effect of dampening the
workers' enthusiasm for extreme socialism but, at the same time,
increased their faith in the state as protector.]
At the same time they were
moving toward an external power structure based on forms deriving from
the most antiquated concepts about the power and splendor of states. An
empire was built which, like the Austria-Hungarian state structure,
contradicted the forces present in the various ethnic communities at that
historic moment. The administrators of this empire saw nothing of these
forces. The state structure which they had in mind could only be based on
military power. The requirements of modern history would have been
satisfied by the implementation of the impulse for a healthy social
organism. If this had been done, relations between nations would have
been different in 1914. Because of their lack of understanding of modern
requirements in ethnic relations, German policy had reached the
zero-point in 1914 as far as possibilities for further action were
concerned. During the preceding decades they had understood nothing of
what should have been done, and German policy had been occupied with
every possibility that had no relation to modern evolutionary forces, and
therefore had to collapse like a house of cards due to its lack of
content.
A true picture of the historic events
surrounding the German Empire's tragic destiny would emerge if an
examination were made of the decisive events in Berlin at the end of July
and August 1, 1914, and the facts presented truthfully to the
world. [The memoirs of General Helmuth von
Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff at the outbreak of the war,
were ready for publication in May 1919. Von Moltke describes the German
Government's attitude at that time, especially on 31 July and 1 August
1914:’The atmosphere grew steadily more tense and I was completely
alone.’ Then he was told by the Kaiser, ‘So now you can do whatever you
want.’ Rudolf Steiner wrote in a commentary: ‘So there it was: the Chief
of the General Staff stood completely alone. Due to the fact that German
policy had reached the zero-point, Europe's destiny on 31 July and 1
August rested in the hands of a man who was obliged to do his military
duty.’ (Vorbemerkungen zu Die Schuld am Krieg, Betrachtungen und
Erinnerungen des Generalstabschefs H. von Moltke.) Aufsätze über
die Dreigliederung des Sozialen Organismus. This ‘military duty’ involved
implementing the German army's predetermined war-plan, prepared by von
Moltke's predecessor General Schlieffen, which provided for the
domination of France before invading Russia. France was to be attacked
through Belgium and Holland. Von Moltke modified the plan to the extent
that Holland was omitted. His memoirs were suppressed in 1919, but Rudolf
Steiner, who was personally acquainted with him, was familiar with their
contents. In an interview which appeared in the French newspaper Le Matin
in October 1921,Steiner said that the memoirs should have been published
in 1919, but they were suppressed because of fear on the part of the
authorities. ‘Why this fear? These memoirs are in no way an accusation
against the imperial government. Something else is involved, which is
perhaps even worse: that this imperial government found itself in a state
of complete confusion and under an incredibly frivolous and ignorant
leadership.’ Jules Sauerman’s interview with Dr. Rudolf Steiner on the
unpublished memoirs of the late Chief of the German General Staff von
Moltke. ibid.] Little is
known of these events, either in Germany or abroad. Whoever is familiar
with them knows that German policy at that time was comparable to a house
of cards, and because of its arrival at a zero-point of activity, the
decision as to whether and how the war was to begin had to be left to the
military. The responsible military authorities at that time could not,
from the military viewpoint, have acted in any other way than they did,
because from this viewpoint the situation could only be seen as they saw
it. Outside the military sector things had come to the point where action
was no longer possible. All this would emerge as historical fact if
someone were to occupy himself with bringing to light the events which
took place in Berlin at the end of July and the beginning of August,
namely, everything which occurred on August 1, and July 31. The illusion
persists that an insight into these events would not be particularly
enlightening if one is familiar with the events which led up to this
time. It is not possible, however, to discuss the ‘guilt question’
without this insight. Certainly one may have knowledge through other
means of the causes which were long present; but insight shows how these
causes acted on events.
The concepts which at that time drove
Germany's leaders to war continued their ruinous work. They became the
national sentiment. They prevented those in power from developing the
necessary insight through the bitter experience of these last terrible
years. Wishing to take advantage of the receptivity which might have
resulted from this experience, I attempted to make known during the war,
which I considered to be the most suitable time, the basic concept of a
healthy social organism and its consequences for German policy, to
personages in Germany and Austria whose influence could still have been
brought to bear in furthering these impulse. [Steiner
wrote a memorandum directed to leading government circles in Germany and
Austria which contained his ideas concerning the way these countries
could act in a manner which would have been beneficial to themselves and
the world. Count Otto Lerchenfeld brought a memorandum to the German
state secretary Kuhlman among others, and Count Ludwig Polzer-Hoditz to
his brother, Austria's chief cabinet officer. The memoranda were not
published during Steiner's lifetime. They are included
in Aufsätze über die
Dreigliederung des Sozialen Organismus.] Those persons who honestly had the German
people's destiny at heart participated in the attempt to gain a hearing
for these ideas. But the attempt was futile. The habits of thinking
resisted such impulses which, to the military mentality, appeared
unworkable. ‘Separation of church and school’: yes, that would be
something; but they got no further. The thoughts of the ‘statesman-like’
thinkers had long been running along the same track, and more drastic
measures were beyond them. Well-meaning people suggested that I make
these ideas public. This was most unsuitable advice at the time. What
good could it have done to have these ideas, among so many others, and
coming from a private individual, disseminated. It is in the nature of
these impulses that they could only have been influential, at that time
if they had come from the appropriate places. Had the sense of these
impulses been favorably proclaimed from the right quarters, the peoples
of central Europe would have realized that here is something which
coincides with their more or less conscious desires. And the Russian
peoples in the east would surely have been sympathetic to these impulses
as an alternative to czarism. This can only be denied by someone who has
no feeling for the receptivity of the East-European mind for healthy
social ideas. Instead of a pronouncement of such ideas, however, came
Brest-Litovsk. [On 15 December 1917. the peace treaty
between Germany and Russia was signed at Brest-Litovsk. The conditions
imposed by Germany were extremely hard (very comparable to those imposed
on her by the allies a year later). As a result of this accord, Germany
was free to concentrate its troops in the west. In Russia, only two
months after the revolution, the new communist government led by Lenin
was anxious to consolidate its power at home without having to continue
the inherited war. The suspicion also exists that Lenin had secretly
agreed to make peace with Germany while he was still in exile in
Switzerland, in return for his famous trip from Zürich to Russia through
Germany in a sealed railway carriage, in order to take command of the
revolution.]
That military thinking could not avert
the catastrophe in central and eastern Europe was apparent to all but the
military minds. The cause of the German people's misfortune was
unwillingness to see that the catastrophe was unavoidable. Nobody wanted to
believe that there was no sense of historic necessity in the places where
decisions were being made. Whoever knew something of these necessities also
realized that there were personages among the English-speaking peoples who
understood the forces at work in the peoples of central and eastern Europe.
They were convinced that a situation was brewing which must result in
mighty social upheavals – but only in central and eastern Europe, for it
was felt that there was not yet either a historical necessity or a
possibility for such upheavals in the English-speaking world. Policy was
formulated accordingly. This was not understood in central and eastern
Europe, and policy was formulated in such a way that it had to collapse
like a house of cards. The only effective policy would have been one based
on an insight into the English-speaking world's liberal recognition of
historical necessities. But the ‘diplomats’ would have found a suggestion
for such a policy superfluous.
Instead of such a policy, which could
have been very advantageous for central and eastern Europe before the
catastrophe of war overtook it, they continued in the same old diplomatic
rut in spite of the liberal orientation of English policy. Furthermore,
during the horrors of war they did not learn from bitter experience that
the mission presented to the world in political declarations from America
should be countered by one born of the vital forces of Europe. An
understanding could have been reached between the mission presented by
Woodrow Wilson from the American point of view, and one heard over the
thunder of cannons as a European spiritual impulse. Any other talk of an
understanding rang hollow in view of the historical necessities.
But a sense of mission based on modern
humanity's true needs was lacking in those responsible for the German
empire's policy. Therefore, what the autumn of 1918 brought was inevitable.
The collapse of military power was accompanied by a spiritual capitulation.
Instead of exerting European will at that time in an attempt to assert the
German people's spiritual impulses, came the simple submission to Wilson's
fourteen point. [President Wilson's ‘fourteen points’
constituted the ideological basis for the principle of ‘self-determination
of peoples,’ which was to underlie the political restructuring of Europe
after the war. This principle presupposes that ethnic groups (peoples,
nations) are perfectly separable and definable, like so many individual
pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. If each governs itself through its own national
state, then the cause of political morality is served. In fact, Europe was
and is a quilt of nations with many overlapping ethnic gray regions. The
effect of self-determination or the ‘nationalities principle’ is the
disenfranchisement of many smaller or larger minorities with the resultant
bitterness and frustration. The course of history since this principle was
put into effect in Europe and elsewhere would seem to support such
criticism. Winston Churchill wrote the following about the carving up of
the Austria-Hungarian empire: ‘The second cardinal tragedy was the complete
break-up of the Austria-Hungarian Empire ... There is not one of these
peoples or provinces that constituted the Empire of the Hapsburgs to whom
gaining their independence has not brought the tortures which ancient poets
and theologians had reserved for the damned.’The Second World War,
Vol. 1, Chap. i, The Gathering Storm.
According to the idea of the ‘social
triformation,’ or ‘threefold society,’ the nationalities (ethnic) problem
can only be solved by liberating ‘national’ life from the power of the
political state. In other words, the creation of a free cultural-spiritual
sector.] Wilson was confronted
with a Germany which had nothing to say for itself. Whatever Wilson may
think about his own fourteen points, he could only help Germany to fulfill
what the country itself wills. Surely he must have expected a demonstration
of this desire. But to the nullity of German policy at the beginning of the
war was added the nullity of 1918; the terrible spiritual capitulation
came, brought on by a man in whom many in the German lands had placed
something like a last hope.
Lack of faith in insights derived from
historically active forces; unwillingness to recognize knowledge derived from
spiritually related impulses: this was what produced central Europe's
situation. Now a new situation has been created by the catastrophe of war. It
can be characterized by the idea of humanity's social impulses as it has been
interpreted in this book. These social impulses speak a language which
confronts the whole civilized world with a mission. Shall thinking about what
must now come about in respect of the social question reach the same
zero-point as did central European policy in respect of its mission in 1914?
Countries which were able to remain aloof from the events of that time may
not do so as far as the social movement is concerned. In this question there
should be no political opponents and no neutrals; there should only be one
humanity, working together, which is able to read the signs of the times and
act in accordance with them.
The intentions described in this book
make it possible to understand why the appeal ‘To the German People and the
Civilized World,’ which is reproduced in the following chapter, was
formulated by the author some time ago and communicated to the world —
especially to the peoples of central Europe — by a committee which
sympathized with its aims. The present situation is different from the one
prevalent at the time in which it was communicated to relatively few. At that
time a wider propagation would have been considered ‘literature.’ Today the
public must bring to it what it could not have brought a short time ago:
understanding men and women who want to work for what it advocates if it is
worth being understood and being put into practice. What should come about
now is only possible through the activity of such people.