Foreword
History
often provides insight into
the present. Consider the American South one hundred and fifty years
ago, for example. There human rights and economic servitude were compressed
into a single domain for black Americans. They became a means of production
that could be bought and sold as a commodity. In many parts of the South
it was forbidden to teach blacks to read. Control by law of education,
part of culture, was found necessary to subordinate human rights to
economics. The domain of rights and economics thus also engulfed
culture.
Today
we recognize rights which are independent from economic power, at least
in principle. Modern workers must accept the authority of their superiors
but only in matters directly related to their employment. Human beings
no longer can be treated as mere means of production. We have separated
economic power from civil rights at least to the extent of making slavery
illegal.
If we
can perceive how law, economics, and culture grew independent of one
another relative to their nearly complete interdependence one hundred
and fifty years ago in the South, then we can imagine the possibility
of their even greater separation. This greater separation of the three
domains - economics, law, and culture-forms the core of Steiner's social
thought. Written in 1919, the essays contained in this volume address
the reconstruction of a shattered Germany. They call for a proper separation
of these three spheres of activity arguing that only this would allow
each to express its essential nature and thereby enable human society
to revitalize itself.
To understand
this separation we must understand the component activities. For law
the essential characteristic is human equality. Law both guarantees
and limits rights, and it does this equally for each person. It governs
the democratic political process in which each person's vote carries
equal weight. Inasmuch as rights must be protected and the law enforced,
it encompasses both the police and the military. The state is its administrative
body. The modern national state, however, oversteps its essential boundaries,
creating a kind of social indigestion in its attempts to legislate both
in the domains of economics and of culture. Economic interests, in turn,
influence legal judgments, often making a sham of human equality.
In the
United States an important barrier to this overstepping is the constitutional
doctrine of the separation of Church and State. The reasoning behind
this doctrine has received considerable interpretation by legal experts
and by the Supreme Court. Part of the discussion revolves around the
ways in which people are considered equal. Thomas Emerson
[1]
argues that we are equal in one way through our need for self-fulfIllment
or self-development, a fundamental aspect of which is belief formation.
Consequently each individual has the right to form his or her beliefs
without government interference. From this follows the separation of
Church and State.
Religion
is one pan of cultural life; another part is education. The separation
of the three activities of society implies that education should be
as independent of the state as is religion. In “The Separation
of School and State” Stephen Arons presents a legal argument for
this separation in the context of U.S. Constitutional law. He states
that the case would have “for its central principle the preservation
of individual conscience from government coercion. The specific application
of this principle to education is that any state-constructed school
system must maintain a neutral position toward parents' educational
choices whenever values or beliefs are at stake. If schools generally
are value-inculcating agencies, that fact raises serious constitutional
questions about how a state can maintain a sufficiently neutral posture
toward values while supporting a system of public education:”
[2]
In other words public schools as a matter of course tend to transmit
those values deemed appropriate by the majority of the public. This
implies choices among such conflicting values as competitiveness and
cooperation, intellect and wisdom, and the status of manual work
vis-a-vis intellectual work. Parents not accepting the majority
view have the right to alternatives.
Current
rulings protect the existence of private schools and their right to
determine their own curricula with minimal state interference. These
rulings exclude “any general power of the state to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only.”
[3]
Arons feels that their implications
go further than is generally accepted. First, they can be interpreted
as prohibiting state financing systems from favoring those who are in
agreement with public school values. In effect every child has the right
to the same educational support at the school of his or her parents'
choice, whether public or private. Otherwise constitutional rights are
reserved for the rich. Second, state regulation of private schools cannot
effect value transmission unless there is legally compelling justification
given by the state. Putting these implications into effect would increase
the separation of school and state.
Steiner argues for separation of culture and state in order that the
essential nature of each can find a healthy form. To understand the
essential nature of the state we must recognize that people may differ
among themselves with respect to musical and other talents, but that
the same people are equal with respect to voting rights. The state will
be healthy when it concerns itself strictly with those matters wherein
people are equal. This human equality is fundamental to the state.
Freedom
is the quality fundamental to the life of culture. It is interesting
that freedom is often thought to be the characteristic of the political
system. On reflection, however, it becomes clear that what is usually
meant by freedom is equality under the law. Indeed, by majority consensus
absolute freedom is limited. For example, a person is not free to murder
or steal. A little reflection also reveals that people are not equal
culturally. Few would deny the cultural superiority of Mozart, Hilbert,
Schweitzer, or Emerson. Thus superiority does not effect the essential
equality of all before the law. It does suggest that the highly gifted
ought to be given more space and time than the merely moderately gifted
to unfold their capacities for the benefit of society.
To understand
Steiner's thinking consider briefly what is involved in a cultural creation,
be it KeKule discovering the benzene ring, Saul Bellow writing a novel,
or Joan of Arc planning a battle. Each of these activities originated
in the creative depths of a unique individual. It issued forth from
soul and spirit under the guidance of his or her own volition and intentionality.
No external compulsion can bring forth inner creative activity. The
individual does it freely or not at all.
Steiner's
thinking about cultural life was directed more toward this inner activity
than to its result or product. For him culture is that realm of society
in which people acquire inner activity and mobility through interaction
with others who have developed this mobility. In the essay
“Cultivation of the Spirit and Economic Life” he says
that cultural life
“aims
at a form of cooperation among men to be based entirely on the free
intercourse and free association of individualty with individuality.
Here human individuality will not be forced into an institutional
mold. How one person assists another, how one helps another advance will
simply arise from what one, through his own abilities and accomplishments,
is able to be for the other. It is no great wonder that presently
many people are still able to imagine nothing but a state of anarchy
as a result of such a free form of human relations in the social order's
spiritual-cultural branch. Those who think so simply do not know what
powers of man's innermost nature are hindered from expanding when
man is forced to develop in the pattern into which the state and economic
system mold him. Such powers, deep within human nature, cannot be
developed by institutions, but only through what one being calls forth
in perfect freedom from another being.”
As Steiner
mentions above, real freedom in culture need not result in chaos. He
provided an example of this in the Waldorf School, which he founded
in Stuttgart in 1919. Based on that impulse the Waldorf Schools have
grown in number to a worldwide confederation of over 350 independent
private primary and secondary schools. The teachers in these schools
retain complete control of the activities within their own classrooms,
as well as of the operation of the school as a whole through a collegial
administrative body. The heart of the pedagogy is a developmental picture
of the child compatible with that of Piaget, whom Steiner predated.
The developmental phases that are outlined in the essay “The Pedagogical
Basis of the Waldorf School” provide a context for the Waldorf
teacher's interaction with children of different ages. This interaction
follows a structured curriculum, where subjects are chosen to assist
the developmental process of each child. The curriculum and the concept
of the developmental phases can be compared to an instrument that the
teacher creatively plays in order to help the students actualize their
potentials. In this way the schools provide an example of free creative
activity within a structure. It is not chaos. Being personally acquairited
with a number of Waldorf students, I can say that they come closer to
realizing their own potentials than practically anyone I know.
This is
in striking contrast to what one finds in the public primary and secondary
schools in the United States. A recent study points to a catastrophic
situation. The report titled
A Nation at Risk
[4]
literally states that if a foreign power had imposed our current
educational system on us, we would have taken it as an act of war. Just
how bad conditions are can be deduced from the results of an English
proficiency exam, given this September to incoming freshmen at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), with a standard of passing
which was embarrassingly low. Of 1131 students who took the exam, about
800 failed. Considering that MIT is among the highest quality
institutions in the
country, receiving applications only from top students and accepting
only the best of them, it is clear that standards of mastery of their
native language among average students in our secondary school system
must be very low indeed.
The report
goes on to urge that something must be done to improve this situation,
giving two compelling reasons. The first is that without a better educated
public the United States will be unable to compete with foreign economies
in the struggle for markets. This is an economic reason. The second
is a political one. Lacking an educated public America will not be able
to keep up its military strength. In Steiner's terms the report suggests
that we nurture the germ which is the underlying cause of the problem.
It should be clear that if these two are the primary reasons for improving
the educational system, then they will influence how it is “improved.”
In reality it is exactly such influences from the state and from economics
that have caused the current catastrophe.
Unhealthy
connections and influences among the several activities of society have
caused catastrophies in economic life as well. Two cases which illustrate
this are developments in the American rail and steel industries since
the second world war. At the beginning of the war the U.S. railroad
system was quite superb. It covered the entire country and was fast
and comfortable. But then companies like New York Central started examining
themselves and decided the business they were really in was making money
and providing dividends for their shareholders. On this basis they took
their surplus funds and bought companies which were unrelated to railroading
but which were judged more profitable than rail. Today we call this
diversification. The deterioration of the railroads' infrastructure
was the consequence. Within a decade the system was in disarray. Similar
events took place in the U. S. steel industry. American steel became
uncompetitive. Those foreign steel manufacturers who had decided that
making steel was their business, and who consequently invested in renewal
and improvement of their plant, became even more efficient while the
American steel-making plant deteriorated.
The decline of American rail and steel can be traced to neglecting the
essential nature of economic life: meeting human needs. They turned,
instead, to the rights of owners, myopically pursuing shareholder profit
and probably management compensation. This is the “pig principle.”
The net impact on society can be found by adding the shareholder's gain
to the external effects, such as the cost of finding and using alternatives
to rail transportation, which are costs to society. The net, a big negative,
is the logical outcome of economic activity losing its primary focus
of meeting needs.
To be
healthy economics must start from and keep this primary focus. Those
at work in economic life concern themselves primarily with the production
and circulation of commodities. What is produced is usually not consumed
by those who produce it. The product serves the needs of others. For
this reason Steiner used the term “brotherliness” (and we
should add sisterliness) to characterize economic activity. He stressed
that this applies only to economies in which the division of labor is
the norm.
But to
characterize actual economic life with the term “brotherliness”
is to contradict much of modern economic thinking. Human economic activity
is more usually characterized by terms like selfishness, personal gain,
and survival. Steiner insists, however, that these ideas are inconsistent
with fundamental economic realities. Since the division of labor, few
individuals have really provided for themselves. We all rely on the
efforts of thousands, indeed millions of others to produce the car we
drive, the food we eat, and the clothes we wear. The reality of modern
economic life is that we take care of one another, i.e., true brotherliness.
Thinking that overlooks this fundamental reality is likely to misguide
economic decisions, as in the two examples cited.
The proper
separation of the three activities of society-economics, law, and culture-would
make it possible for economic life to keep its focus on human needs
and maintain its true brotherly character. Steiner envisioned this coming
about through the working of motivational forces different from those
to which we are accustomed. Self interest, profit, and personal gain
could be replaced by the satisfaction of knowing one is working for
the community good. Steiner argued that this is not a utopian dream;
rather it is a motivation suitable to true human dignity. He also described
new ways of working with wages, capital, and credit that would aid the
advent of this new motivation. The key to its possibility and practicality
is again the proper separation of the three activities.
He explains
in the essay “Ability to Work, Will to Work, and the Threefold
Social Order” that this socially responsible motivation would not
arise from the economic life at all, because purely economic work has
become inherently uninteresting since the division of labor became the
norm. This was not the case for the medieval craftsman who produced
his product in its entirety and then, taking pride in it, received thanks
from his customer. The modern worker is confined to a task that, taken
by itself, i.e., out of the macroeconomic context into which it fits,
is meaningless. The existing economic motivation, money, leads people
to do whatever is necessary to get paid. But it does not activate their
interest in a task that is inherently uninteresting, with the consequence
that absenteeism, alienation, and poor performance have reached alarming
levels. Steiner recognized that socially responsible motivation could
arise only from an independent cultural and political life. In the above
mentioned essay he says that within the cultura1life the individual
“learns
in a living way to understand this human society for which one is
called upon to work; a realm where one learns to see what each single
piece of work means for the combined fabric of the social order, to
see it in such a light that one will learn to love it because of its
value for the whole. It aims at creating in this free life of spirit
the profounder principles that can replace the motive of personal
gain. Only in a free spiritual life can a love for the human social
order spring up that is comparable to the love an artist has for the
creation of his works.”
From
a separate democratically ordered life of law there would also arise
motives to work for society.
“Real
relationships will grow up between people united in a social organism
where each adult has a voice in government and is co-equal with every
other adult: it is relationships such as these that are able to enkindle
the will to work ‘for community.’ One must reflect that a truly
communal feeling can grow only from such relationships, and that from
this feeling the will to work can grow. For in actual practice the
consequence of such a state founded on democratic rights will be that
each human being will take his place with vitality and full consciousness
in the common field of work. Each will know what he is working for;
and each will want to work within the working community, of which
he knows himself a member through his will.”
If we
attempt to fInd examples of this type of motivation operative in contemporary
society, we often fInd negative instances. This is nowhere better exemplified
than at the highest levels of computer research at MIT. This research
is paid for almost entirely by the military. While it is possible to
view it, if one wears just the right kind of glasses, as a pure science
and as “value free,” it is, in fact, in the service of the
military. Scientific results are swiftly converted to the improvement
of implements of mass destruction and of death. Young men and women
work in these fields trying to maintain the illusion that they are doing
abstract science, a “value free” science. They ultimately
have to come to believe that they are not in any way responsible
for the end use of their labor. It is often said that the computer is
a tool having no moral dimension. Clearly this position can be maintained
only if one thinks of human society in abstract terms, i.e. if one denies
the concrete historical and social circumstances in which one lives
and works.”
The effect
of this situation on the researcher needs emphasis. It takes enormous
energy to shield one's eyes from seeing what one is actually doing.
The expenditure of this energy on the part of individuals is expensive
in emotional terms. Ultimately this is the real tragedy, for it reduces
the person to a machine.
There
is a sort of irony involved, a chilling irony. A fear is often expressed
about computers, namely that we will create a machine that is very nearly
like a human being. The irony is that we are making human beings, men
and women, become more and more like machines. For it is human to find
the motive for work, consciously and with conscience and compassion,
in the concrete historical and social context in which one lives. When
this is not possible human beings are robbed of essential humanity.
The quest
for a motive to work befitting human dignity extends from research scientist
to factory worker. One might think, for example, that the steel worker,
if he were educated to picture the use of the product of his work, would
find in the pictures the motivation to work for social good instead
of merely for a living. This presumably could be measured in higher
quality work and reduced absenteeism. On closer inspection, however,
it is doubtful that a look at the actual American context could bring
about such motivation. A large percentage of steel manufactured in America
is used for nothing but trivia. For example, there are on the order
of ten million new automobiles produced in this country every year.
If we restricted ourselves to a replacement market without model changes
and alterations that are purely cosmetic, then we might easily get by,
building, say, half a million cars a year. It is difficult to believe
that the steel worker could be proud of his contribution to society
if underneath he knew that the car his neighbor bought was unnecessary
and that it might have been better to put the resources it required
into feeding the 600 million people on the planet who are malnourished.
In a
volume to be published subsequently to this one Steiner's concept of
“unnecessary production,” i.e., trivia, planned obsolescence,
etc., is introduced. With that discussion and much of what is presented
in this volume it should be evident that Steiner's ideas will be of
interest to those who concern themselves with issues of ecology and
stewardship of the earth. In the broader context ecology must also encompass
a social dimension, making it a social ecology that considers questions
such as right motivation to work. In this sense Steiner's work also
relates to the efforts ofE.F. Schumacher, who read Steiner, and who
tried to introduce us to ideas of appropriate scale and healthy approaches
to post industrial society. These connections should help dispel any
thought that this volume is dated. Rather, Steiner was far ahead of
his time.
Joseph Weizenbaum
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984
Notes:
1. Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment (New York: Random House, 1966).
2. “The Separation of School and State:
Pierce Reconsidered,” Harvard Educational Review,
46 (February 1976):1, pp. 96–97.
3. United States Supreme Court, Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 535 (1925). 4. National
Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative
for Educational Reform; A Report to the Nation (U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1983).
4. National Commission on Excellence in Education,
A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform; A Report
to the Nation (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983).
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