C. THOUGHT
VIII
Thinking as a
Higher Experience within Experience
(See Exposition on Brief, Chapter 8)
A
MID THE
unrelated chaos of experience —
and, indeed, at first as a fact of experience — we find an
element that leads us out beyond this unrelated-ness. This element is
thought. Thought, as one of the facts of experience, assumes an
exceptional position within experience.
As regards the
rest of experience, so long as I limit myself to that which is
immediately present to my senses, I do not advance beyond the
separate units. Assume that I have before me a liquid which I bring
to a boil. At first it is still; then I observe bubbles rising; the
liquid becomes agitated; then all passes over into the form of
steam.
These are the
percepts which follow one another. No matter how I may twist and turn
the thing, if I am limited to that which the senses afford me, I
discover no interrelationship among these facts. As regards thinking,
such is not the case. If, for example, I grasp the thought of cause,
this by its own content leads me to the thought of effect. I need
only hold fast to the thoughts in that form in which they enter into
immediate experience, and they appear as characterizations according
to law.
That which, as regards the rest of
experience, must be brought from elsewhere, if, indeed, it is
applicable at all — interrelationship according to law —
is present as regards thought in its very first appearance. With
respect to the rest of experience, that which enters as an appearance
before my consciousness does not at once manifest the whole of
reality; but, with respect to thought, the whole thing passes over
without residue into what is given to me. In the first case, I must
penetrate the shell in order to reach the kernel; in the second,
shell and kernel are an indivisible unity. It is only a universally
human preconception if thought at first appears to us to be entirely
analogous with the rest of experience. In the case of thought,
we need only overcome this preconception within ourselves. In
the case of the rest of experience, we need to resolve a
difficulty inherent in the fact itself.
That for which we
seek, in the case of the rest of experience, has itself in the case
of thinking become immediate experience.
A difficulty is thereby resolved
which could scarcely be resolved in any other way. It is a
justifiable demand of science that we should limit ourselves to
experience. But it is a no less justifiable demand that we should
seek for the inner law of experience. Therefore this
“inner” must itself appear at some place in
experience. Experience is thus deepened by the help of
experience itself. Our theory of knowledge makes the demand for
experience in the very highest form; it repels every attempt to
introduce something into experience from without. This theory finds
even thought-characterizations within experience. The form in which
thought enters into manifestation is the same as that of the rest of
the world of experience.
The principle of
experience is generally misunderstood both in its scope and in its
true significance. In its baldest form, it is the demand that the
objects of reality should be left in the form of their first
appearance and only thus treated as objects of knowledge. This
is purely a principle of methodology. It says nothing regarding the
content of what is experienced. If it should be asserted that
only sense-percepts can become the objects of knowledge, as is
done by materialism, then it would not be possible to rest upon this
principle. Whether the content be sensible or ideal is not decided by
this principle. But if, in a certain case, it should be applied in
the crassest form, to which we are referring, it certainly
makes a presupposition. That is, it demands that objects, as these
are experienced, shall already possess a form sufficing the strivings
of knowledge. As regards the experience of the external senses, as we
have seen, this is not the case. It occurs only in the case of
thought.
Only in the case
of thought can the principle of experience be applied in the most
extreme sense.
This does not
exclude the principle from being extended also to the rest of the
world. It possesses other forms besides the most extreme. If, for the
purpose of scientific explanation, we cannot leave an object just as
it is immediately experienced, yet this explanation can take place in
such a way that the means which we employ for this purpose are taken
from other spheres of experience. We have then not gone beyond
the bounds of “experience in general.”
A science of knowledge based upon
Goethe's world-conception lays its chief emphasis upon the principle
of remaining always true to experience. No one has recognized so
fully as Goethe the exclusive applicability of this principle.
Indeed, he represented that principle just as rigidly as we have
demanded above. All higher points of view concerning Nature he would
not look upon as anything except experience. They were considered as
“higher Nature within Nature.”
[Cf. Goethe: Dichtung und Wahrheit.
XXII. 24 f.]
In the essayNature
he says that we are incapable of getting outside
Nature. If, then, we desire to interpret Nature to ourselves in
this sense, which was his, we must find the means within Nature
herself.
But how would it
be possible to base a science of knowledge upon the principle of
experience if we did not find anywhere in experience the basic
element in all that is scientific — that is, ideal conformity
to law? We need merely take hold of this element, as we have seen; we
need merely submerge ourselves in it. For it exists in
experience.
Now, does thought
really meet us, and become known to our individuality, in such a way
that we can with justice claim for it the characteristics emphasized
above? Any one who fixes his attention upon this point will
discover that an essential difference exists between the form in
which an external phenomenon of sense-reality becomes known to us
— or, indeed, even some other process of our mental life
— and that in which we become aware of our own thought. In the
former case we are definitely aware that we are in the presence of an
already existent thing: existent, that is, in so far as it has become
a phenomenon without our having exerted any determinative influence
in its becoming. This is not true of thought. Only for the first
moment does thought seem similar to the rest of experience. When we
lay hold upon any thought, we know, in spite of the utter immediacy
with which it enters our consciousness, that we are inwardly bound up
with its manner of coming into existence. When any sudden idea
occurs to me, entering my mind quite abruptly, so that its
appearance is, therefore, from a certain point of view very
much like that of an external event which must first be mediated to
me by eye or ear, yet I always know that the field upon which this
thought comes to manifestation is my own consciousness; I know that
my own activity must first be called upon before the sudden idea can
be made to come into existence. In the case of every external object,
I am aware that at first it reveals only its outside to my senses; as
regards a thought, I know quite certainly that what it exposes to me
is its all; that it enters my consciousness as a totality complete in
itself. The external stimuli that we must always presuppose in the
case of an external object are not present in the case of thought. It
is to these stimuli that we must ascribe the fact that sensible
phenomena appear to us as something already existent; it is to them
that we must ascribe the genesis of these phenomena. As regards a
thought, I have the assurance that this genesis is not possible apart
from my own activity. I must work through the thought, must re-create
its content, must live through it even in its least details, if it is
to have any significance for me whatever.
Thus far we have
arrived at the following truths. At the first stage of
world-contemplation, the whole of reality meets us as an unrelated
aggregate; thought is included within this chaos. If we move through
this multiplicity, we find in it one constituent which possesses,
even in this first form of its appearance, that character which the
rest of the multiplicity must afterwards gain. This constituent is
thought. That which must be surmounted in the case of the rest of
experience — that is, the form of its immediate
appearance — is to be retained in the case of thought. This
factor of reality which is to be allowed to remain in its original
state we find in our consciousness, and we are united with it in such
fashion that the activity of our own mind is at the same time the
manifestation of this factor. These are one and the same fact seen
from two sides. This fact is the thought-content of the world. In the
one instance, it appears as an activity of our consciousness;
in the other, as the immediate manifestation of a conformity to law,
complete within itself, a self-determined ideal content. We shall
quickly see which side possesses the greater
weight.
Since, now, we
stand inside the thought-content and permeate this in all its
ingredients, we are in position really to know its very nature. The
manner in which it meets us is a guarantee of the fact that the
characteristics which we have attributed to it really belong to it.
It can, therefore, certainly serve as the point of departure for
every further form of world-contemplation. The essential character of
thought can be derived from thought itself; if we would arrive at the
essential character of the rest of things, our point of departure in
this inquiry must be thinking. Let us at once express the matter more
clearly. Since we experience in thinking alone a real conformity to
law, an ideal determinateness, therefore the conformity to law of the
rest of the world, which we do not experience in this itself, must
also lie included within thought. In other words, thought and the
appearance for the senses are face to face in experience. The latter,
however, gives us no disclosure of its own nature; the former gives
us this both as to itself and as to the nature of this appearance for
the senses.
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