III
WHY THE DESIRE FOR KNOWLEDGE IS FUNDAMENTAL
Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust,
Die eine will sich von der andern trennen;
Die eine hält, in derber Liebeslust,
Sich an die Welt mit klammerden Organen;
Die andre hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust
Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.
FAUST, I, 1112–1117.
Two souls, alas! reside within my breast,
And each withdraws from, and repels, its brother.
One with tenacious organs holds in love
And clinging lust the world in its embraces;
The other strongly sweeps, this dust above,
Into the high ancestral spaces.
Faust, Part I, Scene 2.
(Bayard Taylor's translation)
N these
words Goethe expresses a trait which is deeply ingrained in human
nature. Man is not a self-contained unity. He demands ever more than
the world, of itself, offers him. Nature has endowed us with needs,
but left their satisfaction to our own activity. However abundant the
gifts which we have received, still more abundant are our desires. We
seem born to dissatisfaction. And our desire for knowledge is but a
special instance of this unsatisfied striving. Suppose we look twice
at a tree. The first time we see its branches at rest, the second
time in motion. We are not satisfied with this observation. Why, we
ask, does the tree appear to us now at rest, then in motion? Every
glance at nature evokes in us a multitude of questions. Every
phenomenon we meet presents a new problem to be solved. Every
experience is to us a riddle. We observe that from the egg there
emerges a creature like the mother animal, and we ask for the reason
of the likeness. We observe a living being grow and develop to a
determinate degree of perfection, and we seek the conditions of this
experience. Nowhere are we satisfied with the facts which nature
spreads out before our senses. Everywhere we seek what we call the
explanation of these facts.
The
something more which we seek in things, over and above what is
immediately given to us in them, splits our whole being into two
parts. We become conscious of our opposition to the world. We oppose
ourselves to the world as independent beings. The universe has for us
two opposite poles: Self and World.
We erect
this barrier between ourselves and the world as soon as consciousness
is first kindled in us. But we never cease to feel that, in spite of
all, we belong to the world, that there is a connecting link between
it and us, and that we are beings within, and not without, the
universe.
This
feeling makes us strive to bridge over this opposition, and
ultimately the whole spiritual striving of mankind is nothing but the
bridging of this opposition. The history of our spiritual life is a
continuous seeking after union between ourselves and the world.
Religion, Art, and Science follow, one and all, this goal. The
religious man seeks in the revelation, which God grants him, the
solution of the world problem, which his Self, dissatisfied with the
world of mere phenomena, sets him as a task. The artist seeks to
embody in his material the ideas which are his Self, that he may thus
reconcile the spirit which lives within him and the outer world. He
too, feels dissatisfied with the world of mere appearances, and seeks
to mould into it that something more which his Self supplies and
which transcends appearances. The thinker searches for the laws of
phenomena. He strives to master by thought what he experiences by
observation. Only when we have transformed the world-content into our
thought-content do we recapture the connection which we had ourselves
broken off. We shall see later that this goal can be reached only if
we penetrate much more deeply than is often done into the nature of
the scientist's problem. The whole situation, as I have here stated
it, meets us, on the stage of history, in the conflict between the
one-world theory, or Monism, and the two-world theory or Dualism.
Dualism pays attention only to the separation between the Self and
the World, which the consciousness of man has brought about. All its
efforts consist in a vain struggle to reconcile these opposites,
which it calls now Mind and Matter, now Subject and Object, now
Thought and Appearance. The Dualist feels that there must be a bridge
between the two worlds, but is not able to find it. Monism pays
attention only to the unity and tries either to deny or to slur over
the opposites, present though they are. Neither of these two points
of view call satisfy us, for they do not do justice to the facts. The
Dualist sees in Mind (Self) and Matter (World) two essentially
different entities, and cannot therefore understand how they can
interact with one another. How should Mind be aware of what goes on
in Matter, seeing that the essential nature of Matter is quite alien
to Mind? Or how in these circumstances should Mind act upon Matter,
so as to translate its intentions into actions? The most absurd
hypotheses have been propounded to answer these questions. However,
up to the present the Monists are not in a much better position. They
have tried three different ways of meeting the difficulty. Either
they deny Mind and become Materialists; or they deny Matter in order
to seek their salvation as Spiritualists; or they assert that, even
in the simplest entities in the world, Mind and Matter are
indissolubly bound together, so that there is no need to marvel at
the appearance in man of these two modes of existence, seeing that
they are never found apart.
Materialism can never offer a satisfactory explanation of the world.
For every attempt at an explanation must begin with the formation of
thoughts about the phenomena of the world. Materialism, thus, begins
with the thought of Matter or material processes. But, in doing so,
it is ipso facto confronted by two different sets of facts,
viz., the material world and the thoughts about it. The Materialist
seeks to make these latter intelligible by regarding them as purely
material processes. He believes that thinking takes place in the
brain, much in the same way that digestion takes place in the animal
organs. Just as he ascribes mechanical, chemical, and organic
processes to Nature, so he credits her in certain circumstances with
the capacity to think. He overlooks that, in doing so, he is merely
shifting the problem from one place to another. Instead of to himself
he ascribes the power of thought to Matter. And thus he is back again
at his starting-point. How does Matter come to think of its own
nature? Why is it not simply satisfied with itself and content to
accept its own existence? The Materialist has turned his attention
away from the definite subject, his own self, and occupies himself
with an indefinite shadowy somewhat. And here the old problem meets
him again. The materialistic theory cannot solve the problem, it can
only shift it to another place.
What of
the Spiritualistic theory? The Spiritualist denies Matter (the World)
and regards it merely as a product of Mind (the Self). He supposes
the whole phenomenal word to be nothing more than a fabric woven by
Mind out of itself. This conception of the world finds itself in
difficulties as soon as it attempts to deduce from Mind any single
concrete phenomenon. It cannot do so either in knowledge or in
action. If one would really know the external world, one must turn
one's eye outwards and draw on the fund of experience. Without
experience Mind can have no content. Similarly, when it comes to
acting, we have to translate our purposes into realities with the
help of material things and forces. We are, therefore, dependent on
the outer world. The most extreme Spiritualist or, if you prefer it,
Idealist, is Johann Gottlieb Fichte. He attempts to deduce the whole
edifice of the world from the “Ego.” What he has actually
accomplished is a magnificent thought-picture of the world, without
any empirical content. As little as it is possible for the
Materialist to argue the Mind away, just as little is it possible for
the Idealist to do without the outer world of Matter.
A
curious variant of Idealism is to be found in the theory which
F. A. Lange has put forward in his widely read
History of Materialism.
He holds that the Materialists are quite right in
declaring all phenomena, including our thought, to be the product of
purely material processes, but, in turn, Matter and its processes are
for him themselves the product of our thinking. “The senses
give us only the effects of things, not true copies, much less the
things themselves. But among these mere effects we must include the
senses themselves together with the brain and the molecular
vibrations which we assume to go on there.” That is, our
thinking is produced by the material processes, and these by our
thinking. Lange's philosophy is thus nothing more than the
philosophical analogon of the story of honest Baron Munchhausen, who
holds himself up in the air by his own pigtail.
The third
form of Monism is that which finds even in the simplest real (the
atom) the union of both Matter and Mind. But nothing is gained by
this either, except that the question, the origin of which is really
in our consciousness, is shifted to another place. How comes it that
the simple real manifests itself in a twofold manner, if it is an
indivisible unity?
Against
all these theories we must urge the fact that we meet with the basal
and fundamental opposition first in our own consciousness. It is we
ourselves who break away from the bosom of Nature and contrast
ourselves as Self with the World. Goethe has given classic expression
to this in his essay
Nature.
“Living in the midst of her (Nature) we are strangers to her.
Ceaselessly she speaks to us, yet betrays none of her secrets.”
But Goethe knows the reverse side too:
“Mankind is all in her, and she in all mankind.”
However
true it may be that we have estranged ourselves from Nature, it is
none the less true that we feel we are in her and belong to her. It
can be only her own life which pulses also in us.
We must
find the way back to her again. A simple reflection may point this
way out to us. We have, it is true, torn ourselves away from Nature,
but we must none the less have carried away something of her in our
own selves. This quality of Nature in us we must seek out, and then
we shall discover our connection with her once more. Dualism neglects
to do this. It considers the human mind as a spiritual entity utterly
alien to Nature and attempts somehow to hitch it on to Nature. No
wonder that it cannot find the coupling link. We can find Nature
outside of us only if we have first learnt to know her within us. The
Natural within us must be our guide to her. This marks out our path
of inquiry. We shall attempt no speculations concerning the
interaction of Mind and Matter. We shall rather probe into the depths
of our own being, to find there those elements which we saved in our
flight from Nature.
The
examination of our own being must bring the solution of the problem.
We must reach a point where we can say, “This is no longer
merely ‘I,' this is something which is more than
‘I.'”
I am well
aware that many who have read thus far will not consider my
discussion in keeping with “the present state of
science.” To such criticism I can reply only that I have so far
not been concerned with any scientific results, but simply with the
description of what every one of us experiences in his own
consciousness. That a few phrases have slipped in about attempts to
reconcile Mind and the World has been due solely to the desire to
elucidate the actual facts. I have therefore made no attempt to give
to the expressions “Self,” “Mind,”
“World,” “Nature,” the precise meaning which
they usually bear in Psychology and Philosophy. The ordinary
consciousness ignores the sharp distinctions of the sciences, and so
far my purpose has been solely to record the facts of everyday
experience. To object that the above discussions have been
unscientific would be like quarrelling with the reciter of a poem for
failing to accompany every line at once with æsthetic criticism.
I am concerned, not with the way in which science, so far, has
interpreted consciousness, but with the way in which we experience it
every moment of our lives.
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