Valentin Weigel and Jacob Boehme
Paracelsus was primarily concerned with developing ideas about nature that
breathe the spirit of the higher cognition he advocated. A kindred thinker
who applied the same way of thinking to man's own nature in particular is
Valentin Weigel (15331588). He grew out of Protestant theology as Eckhart,
Tauler, and Suso grew out of Catholic theology. He had precursors in
Sebastian Frank and Caspar Schwenckfeldt. They emphasized the deepening of
the inner life, in contrast to the church dogma with its attachment to an
external creed. For them it is not the Jesus whom the Gospels preach who is
of value, but the Christ who can be born in every man out of his deeper
nature, and who is to be his deliverer from the lower life and his leader in
the ascent to the ideal. Weigel quietly and modestly administered his
incumbency in Zschopau. It is only from his posthumous writings printed in
the seventeenth century that one discovers something about the significant
ideas he had developed concerning the nature of man. (Of his writings we
shall mention here: Der güldene Griff, Alle Ding ohne Irrthumb zu
erkennen, vielen Hochgelährten unbekannt, und doch allen Menschen
nothwendig zu wissen, The Golden art of Knowing Everything without Error,
unknown to Many of the Learned, and yet Necessary for all Men to Know.
Erkenne dich selber, Know Thyself. Vom Ort der Welt,
Of the Place of the World.) Weigel is
anxious to come to a clear idea of his relationship to the teachings of the
Church. This leads him to investigate the foundations of all cognition. Man
can only decide whether he can know something through a creed if he understands
how he knows. Weigel takes his departure from the lowest kind of
cognition. He asks himself, How do I apprehend a sensory thing when it confronts
me? From there he hopes to be able to ascend to the point where he can give an
account of the highest cognition. In sensory apprehension the instrument (sense organ) and the thing, the counterpart, confront each
other. Since in natural perception there must be two things, namely the
object or counterpart, which is to be perceived and seen by the eye, and the
eye, or the perceiver, which sees and perceives the object, therefore,
consider the question, Does the perception come from the object into the
eye, or does the judgment, and the perception, flow from the eye into the
object. (Der güldene Griff, chap. 9)
Now Weigel says to himself, If the
perception flowed from the counterpart (thing) into the eye, then, of one
and the same thing, the same complete perception would of necessity have to
arise in all eyes. But this is not the case; rather, everyone sees according
to his eyes. Only the eyes, not the counterpart, can be responsible for the
fact that many different conceptions of one and the same thing are possible.
In order to make the matter clear, Weigel compares seeing with reading. If
the book did not exist of course I could not read it; but it could be there,
and I would still not be able to read anything in it if I did not know the
art of reading. Thus the book must be there, but of itself it cannot give me
anything at all; everything that I read I must bring forth out of myself.
That is also the nature of natural (sensory) perception. Color exists as a
counterpart; but out of itself it cannot give the eye anything. On
its own, the eye must perceive what color is. The color is no more in the eye
than the content of the book is in the reader. If the content of the book
were in the reader. he would not have to read it. Nevertheless, in reading,
this content does not flow out of the book, but out of the reader. It is the
same with the sensory object. What this sensory object is outside, does not
flow into man from the outside, but rather from the inside. On the basis
of these ideas one could say, If all perception flows from man into the object,
then one does not perceive what is in the object, but only what is in man
himself. A detailed elaboration of this train of thought is presented in the
views of
Immanuel Kant
(17241804). (I have shown the erroneous aspect of
this train of thought in my book,
Die Philosophie der Freiheit,
Philosophy of Spiritual Activity.
Here I must confine myself to saying that with this simple, straightforward
way of thinking Valentin Weigel stands on a much higher level than Kant.)
Weigel says to himself, Although perception flows
from man yet it is only the nature of the counterpart which emerges from the
latter by way of man. As it is the content of the book which I discover by
reading and not my own, so it is the color of the counterpart which I
discover through the eye, not the color which is in the eye, or in me. On
his own path Weigel thus comes to a conclusion which we have already
encountered in the thinking of Nicolas of Cusa. In his way Weigel has
elucidated the nature of sensory perception for himself. He has attained the
conviction that everything external things have to tell us can only flow out
from within ourselves. Man cannot remain passive if he wants to perceive the
things of the senses, and be content with letting them act upon him; he must be
active, and bring this perception out of himself. The counterpart alone
awakens the perception in the spirit. Man ascends to higher cognition when
the spirit becomes its own object. In considering sensory perception, one
can see that no cognition can flow into man from the outside. Therefore the
higher cognition cannot come from the outside, but can only be awakened
within man. Hence there can be no external revelation, but only an inner
awakening. And as the external counterpart waits until man confronts it, in
whom it can express its nature, so must man wait, when he wants to be his
own counterpart, until the cognition of his nature is awakened in him. While
in the sensory perception man must be active in order to present the
counterpart with its nature, in the higher cognition he must remain passive,
because now he is the counterpart. He must receive his nature within
himself. Because of this the cognition of the spirit appears to him as an
illumination from on high. In contrast with the sensory perception, Weigel
therefore calls the higher cognition the light of grace. This
light of grace is in reality nothing but the self-cognition of the
spirit in man, or the rebirth of knowledge on the higher level of seeing.
As Nicolas of Cusa, in pursuing his road from knowing to seeing, does not really
let the knowledge acquired by him be reborn on a higher level, but is deceived
into regarding the church creed, in which he had been educated, as this rebirth,
so is this the case with Weigel too. He finds his way to the right road, and
loses it again at the moment he enters upon it. One who wants to walk the
road which Weigel indicates can regard the latter as a leader only up to its
starting-point.
What we encounter in the works of the master shoemaker of Görlitz, Jacob
Boehme (15751624), is like the jubilation of nature, which, at the peak of
its development, admires its essence. Before us appears a man whose words
have wings, woven out of the blissful feeling that he sees the knowledge in
himself shining as higher wisdom. Jacob Boehme describes his condition as a
devotion which only desires to be wisdom, and as a wisdom which desires to
live in devotion alone: When I wrestled and fought, with God's assistance,
there arose a wondrous light in my soul which was altogether foreign to wild
nature, and by which I first understood what God and man are, and what God
has to do with man. Jacob Boehme no longer feels himself to be a separate
personality which utters its insights; he feels himself to be an organ of
the great universal spirit which speaks in him. The limits of his
personality do not appear to him as limits of the spirit which speaks out of
him. For him this spirit is omnipresent. He knows that the sophist will
censure him when he speaks of the beginning of the world and of its
creation, since I was not there and did not see it myself. Let him be told
that in the essence of my soul and body, when I was not yet the I, but
Adam's essence, I was indeed there, and that I myself have forfeited my
felicity in Adam. It is only in external similes that Boehme can intimate
how the light broke forth within himself. When as a boy he once is on the
summit of a mountain, above where great red stones seem to close the
mountain off, he sees an open entrance, and in its depths a vessel
containing gold. He is overcome with awe, and goes his way without touching
the treasure. Later he is serving his apprenticeship with a shoemaker in
Görlitz. A stranger walks into the store and asks for a pair of shoes.
Boehme is not allowed to sell them to him in the master's absence. The
stranger leaves, but after a while calls the apprentice outside and says to
him, Jacob, you are little, but one day you will become an altogether
different man, at whom the world will be filled with astonishment. At a more
mature period of his life Jacob Boehme sees the sunshine reflected in a
burnished pewter vessel; the sight which confronts him seems to him to
reveal a profound mystery. From the time he experiences this manifestation
he believes himself to be in possession of the key to the mysterious
language of nature. He lives as a spiritual hermit, supporting himself
modestly by his trade, and at the same time setting down, as if for his own
memory, the notes which sound in him when he feels the spirit within
himself. The zealotry of priestly fanaticism makes his life difficult. He
wants to read only that scripture which the light within himself illuminates
for him, but is pursued and tormented by those to whom only the external
scripture, the rigid, dogmatic creed, is accessible.
Jacob Boehme is filled with a restlessness which impels him toward
cognition, because a universal mystery lives in his soul. He feels himself
to be immersed in a divine harmony with his spirit, but when he looks around
him he sees disharmony everywhere in the divine works. To man belongs the
light of wisdom, yet he is exposed to error; there lives in him the impulse
toward the good, and yet the dissonance of evil can be heard throughout the
course of human development. Nature is governed by great natural laws, and
yet its harmony is disturbed by superfluities and by the wild struggle of
the elements. How is the disharmony in the harmonious, universal whole to be
understood? This question torments Jacob Boehme. It comes to occupy the
center of his world of ideas. He wants to attain a conception of the
universal whole which includes the inharmonious too. For how can a
conception explain the world which leaves the existing inharmonious elements
aside, unexplained? Disharmony must be explained through harmony, evil
through good itself. In speaking of these things, let us limit ourselves to
good and evil; in the latter, disharmony in the narrower sense finds its
expression in human life. For this is what Jacob Boehme basically limits
himself to. He can do this, for to him nature and man appear as one essence.
He sees similar laws and processes in both. The non-functional is for him an
evil in nature, just as the evil is for him something non-functional in
human destiny. Here and there it is the same basic forces which are at work.
To one who has understood the origin of evil in man, the origin of evil in
nature is also plain. How is it possible for evil as well as for good to
flow out of the same primordial essence? If one speaks in the spirit of
Jacob Boehme, one gives the following answer: The primordial essence does
not exist in itself alone. The diversity of the world participates in this
existence. As the human body does not live its life as a single part, but as
a multiplicity of parts, so too does the primordial essence. And as human
life is poured into this multiplicity of parts, so is the primordial essence
poured into the diversity of the things of this world. Just as it is true that
the whole man has one life, so is it true that each part has its own
life. And it no more contradicts the whole harmonious life of man that his
hand should turn against his own body and wound it, than it is impossible
that the things of the world, which live the life of the primordial essence
in their own way, should turn against one another. Thus the primordial life,
in distributing itself over different lives, bestows upon each life the
capacity of turning itself against the whole. It is not out of the good that
the evil flows, but out of the manner in which the good lives. As the light
can only shine when it penetrates the darkness, so the good can only come to
life when it permeates its opposite. Out of the abyss of darkness
shines the light; out of the abyss of the indifferent, the good
brings itself forth. And as in the shadow it is only brightness which requires a
reference to light, while the darkness is felt to be self-evident, as something
that weakens the light, so too in the world it is only the lawfulness in all
things which is sought, and the evil, the non-functional, which is accepted
as the self-evident. Hence, although for Jacob Boehme the primordial essence
is the All, nothing in the world can be understood unless one keeps in sight
both the primordial essence and its opposite. The good has swallowed the
evil or the repugnant into itself . . . Every being has good and evil within
itself; and in its development, having to decide between them, it becomes an
opposition of qualities, since one of them seeks to overcome the other. It
is therefore entirely in the spirit of Jacob Boehme to see both good and
evil in every object and process of the world; but it is not in his spirit
to seek the primordial essence without further ado in the mixture of the
good with the evil. The primordial essence had to swallow the evil, but the
evil is not a part of the primordial essence. Jacob Boehme seeks the
primordial foundation of the world, but the world itself arose out of the abyss
by means of the primordial foundation. The external world is not God,
and in eternity is not to be called God, but is only a being in which God
reveals Himself . . . When one says, God is everything, God is heaven and
earth and also the external world, then this is true; for everything has its
origin from Him and in Him. But what am I to do with such a saying that is not
a religion? With this conception as a background, his ideas about
the nature of the world developed in Jacob Boehme's spirit in such a way that he
lets the lawful world arise out of the abyss in a succession of stages. This
world is built up in seven natural forms. The primordial essence receives a
form in dark acerbity, silently enclosed within itself and motionless. It is
under the symbol of salt that Boehme conceives this acerbity. With such
designations he leans upon Paracelsus, who has borrowed the names for the
process of nature from the chemical processes
(cf. above).
By swallowing its
opposite, the first natural form takes on the shape of the second; the harsh
and motionless takes on motion; energy and life enter into it. Mercury is
the symbol for this second form. In the struggle of stillness with motion,
of death with life, the third natural form (sulphur) appears. This life,
with its internal struggle, is revealed to itself; henceforth it does not
live in an external struggle of its parts; like a uniformly shining
lightning, illuminating itself, it thrills through its own being (fire).
This fourth natural form ascends to the fifth, the living struggle of the
parts reposing within itself (water). On this level exists an inner acerbity
and silence as on the first, only it is not an absolute quiet, a silence of
the inner contrasts, but an inner movement of the contrasts. It is not the
quiet which reposes within itself, but which has motion, which was kindled
by the fiery lightning of the fourth stage. On the sixth level, the
primordial essence itself becomes aware of itself as such an inner life; it
perceives itself through sense organs. It is the living organisms, endowed
with senses, which represent this natural form. Jacob Boehme calls it sound
or resonance, and thus sets up the sensory impression of hearing as a symbol
for sensory perception in general. The .seventh natural form is the spirit
elevating itself by virtue of its sensory perceptions (wisdom). It finds
itself again as itself, as the primordial foundation, within the world which
has grown out of the abyss and shaped itself out of harmonious and
inharmonious elements. The Holy Ghost brings the splendor of majesty into
the entity in which the Divinity stands revealed. With such
conceptions Jacob Boehme seeks to fathom that world which, in accordance
with the knowledge of his time, appears to him as the real one. For him facts
are what the natural science of his time and the Bible regard as such. His way
of thinking is one thing, his world of facts another. One can imagine the
former as applied to a quite different factual knowledge. And thus there
appears before our mind a Jacob Boehme who could also be living at the turn
of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Such a man would not penetrate
with his thinking the biblical story of the Creation and the struggle of the
angels with the devils, but rather Lyell's geological insights and the
natural history of creation of
Haeckel.
One who penetrates to the spirit of Jacob Boehme's writings must come to
this conviction.* (We shall mention the most important of these
writings: Die Morgenröthe im Aufgang, The Coming of the Dawn.
Die drei Prinzipien göttlichen Wesens, The Three Principles of the
Divine Essence. Vom dreifachen Leben des Menschen, Of the Threefold Life
of Man. Das umgewandte Auge, The Eye Turned Upon Itself.
Signatura rerum oder von der Geburt und Bezeichnung aller Wesen,
Signatura rerum or of the birth and designation of all beings.
Mysterium magnum.)
*
This sentence must not be understood as meaning that the investigation of
the Bible and of the spiritual world would be an aberration at the present
time; what is meant is that a Jacob Boehme of the nineteenth
century would be led by paths similar to those which led the one of
the sixteenth century to the Bible, to the natural history of
creation. But from there he would press forward to the spiritual world.