XIV
Goethe's Meteorological Conceptions
Just as
in geology, so in meteorology it would be an error to go into what
Goethe actually achieved and consider that to be the main thing. His
meteorological experiments are in fact nowhere complete. One can only
look everywhere at his intention. His thinking was always directed at
finding the pregnant
[ 70 ]
point from which a series of phenomena governs itself from within outward.
Any explanation that takes manifestations, incidentals, from here and there
in order to construct a regular series of phenomena was not in accordance
with his approach. When confronted by a phenomenon, he looked for
everything related to it, for all the facts belonging in the same
sphere, in such a way that a whole, a totality, lay before him.
Within this sphere, a principle then had to be found that made all
the regularity, the whole sphere of related phenomena, in fact,
appear as a necessity. It did not seem to him to be in accordance
with nature to explain the phenomena in this sphere by
introducing circumstances lying outside it. This is where we must
seek the key to the principle he set up in meteorology. “More
and more each day I felt the complete inadequacy of ascribing such
constant phenomena to the planets, to the moon, or to some unknown
ebb and flow of the atmosphere ...” “But we reject all
such influences; we consider the weather phenomena on earth to be
neither cosmic nor planetary, but rather, according to our premises,
we must explain them as being purely telluric.” He
wanted to trace back the phenomena of the atmosphere to their causes,
which lay in the being of the earth itself. The important thing, to
begin with, was to find the point where the basic lawfulness that
determines everything else expresses itself directly. Barometric
pressure provided just such a phenomenon. Goethe then regarded this
also as the archetypal phenomenon and sought to connect everything
else to it. He tried to follow the rise and fall of the barometer and
believed that he also perceived a regularity in it. He studied
Schrön's tables and found “that the aforementioned rise
and fall follow an almost parallel course at different points
of observation, whether nearby or remote, and also in different
longitudes, latitudes, and altitudes.” Since this rising and
falling seemed to him to be a direct manifestation of gravity, he
believed that he saw in barometric changes a direct expression of the
quality of the force of gravity itself. But one must not infer
anything more from this Goethean explanation. Goethe rejected any
setting up of hypotheses. He wanted to provide only an expression for
an observable phenomenon, not an actual factual cause, in the sense
of present-day natural science. He believed the other atmospheric
phenomena should fit in quite well with this phenomenon. The
formation of clouds interested the poet most of all. For this, he had
found in Howard's teachings a means of grasping the ever-changing
forms in certain basic configurations and thus of “firming up
with enduring thoughts, something that exists as a changing
phenomenon.” He still sought in addition only some means that
would help him understand the transformations of the cloud forms,
just as he found in that “spiritual ladder” a means of
explaining the transformation of the typical leaf shape in the plant.
Just as there the spiritual ladder was for him the red thread running
through the individual configurations, so here in meteorology it is
for him a varying “constitution” (Geeigenschaftetsein) of
the atmosphere at varying altitudes. In both cases, we must bear in
mind that it could never occur to Goethe to regard such a red thread
as a real configuration. He was perfectly aware of the fact that only
the individual configuration is to be regarded as real for the senses
in space, and that all higher principles of explanation are
there only for the eyes of the spirit. Present-day refutations
of Goethe are therefore mostly a jousting with windmills. One
attributes to his principles a form of reality that he himself denied
them and believes one has overcome him in this way. But present-day
natural science does not know that form of reality upon which he
based things: the objective, concrete idea. From this side, Goethe
must therefore remain foreign to present-day science.
|