I Goethe's
Place in the Development of Western Thought
Goethe
and Schiller
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Goethe
tells of a conversation that once unfolded
between Schiller and himself after both had attended a meeting of the
society of natural research in Jena. Schiller showed himself little
satisfied with what had been presented in the meeting. A fragmented
way of looking at nature had met him there. And he remarked that such
a way could not appeal at all to laymen. Goethe replied that it would
perhaps remain strange even to the initiated themselves and that there
could be still another way of presenting nature, not as something separated
and isolated but rather as working and alive, as striving from the whole
into the parts. And now Goethe developed the great ideas which had arisen
in him about the nature of the plants. He sketched “with many a
characteristic pen-stroke, a symbolic plant” before Schiller's
eyes. This symbolic plant was meant to express the being that lives
in every individual plant no matter what particular forms the plant
might assume. It was meant to show the successive becoming of the individual
plant parts, their emerging from each other, and their relatedness to
each other. About this symbolic plant shape Goethe, on April 17, 1787
in Palermo, wrote down the words, “There must after all be such
a one! How would I otherwise know that this or that formation is a plant,
if they were not all formed according to the same model.” Goethe
had developed within him the mental picture of a malleable-ideal form
which reveals itself to the spirit when it looks out over the manifoldness
of plant shapes and is attentive to what they have in common. Schiller
contemplated this formation, which supposedly lived not in one single
plant but rather in all plants, and said, shaking his head, “That
is not an experience, that is an idea.” These words appeared to
Goethe as though coming from a foreign world. He was conscious of the
fact that he had arrived at his symbolic shape through the same kind
of naive perception as the mental picture of a thing which one can see
with one's eyes and grasp with one's hands. Like the individual plant,
the symbolic or archetypal plant was for him an objective being. He
believed he had not arbitrary speculation but rather unbiased observation
to thank for the archetypal plant. He could not respond with anything
other than, “I can be very glad, then, when I have ideas without
knowing it, and in fact even see them with my eyes.” And
he was extremely unhappy as Schiller rejoined with the words, “How
can an experience ever be given that could be considered to correspond
to an idea. For the characteristic nature of the idea consists in the
fact that no experience could ever coincide with it.”
Two opposing world views
confront each other in this conversation. Goethe sees in the idea of
a thing an element that is immediately present within the thing, working
and creating in it. In his view an individual thing takes on particular
forms because the idea must, in a given case, live itself out in a specific
way. It makes no sense to Goethe to say that a thing does not correspond
to the idea. For the thing cannot be anything else than that into which
the idea has made it. Schiller thinks otherwise. For him the world of
ideas and the world of experience are two separate realms. To experience
belong the manifold things and events which fill space and time. Confronting
it there stands the realm of ideas as a differently constituted reality
of which reason takes possession. Because man's knowledge flows to him
from two sides, from without through observation and from within through
thinking, Schiller distinguishes two sources of knowledge. For Goethe
there is only one source of knowledge, the world of experience,
in which the world of ideas is included. For him it is impossible to
say, “experience and idea,” because to him the idea
lies, through spiritual experience, before the spiritual eye in the
same way that the sense world lies before the physical eye.
Schiller's view came from
the philosophy of his time. One must seek in Greek antiquity for the
underlying mental pictures which have given this philosophy its stamp,
and which have become driving forces of our entire Western spiritual
development. One can gain a picture of the particular nature of the
Goethean world view if one tries in a certain way, with ideas which
one borrows solely from it, to characterize this world view entirely
out of it itself. This is to be striven for in the later parts of this
book. Such a characterization can be aided, however, by taking a preliminary
look at the fact that Goethe expressed himself about certain things
in this or that way because he felt himself to be in agreement with,
or in opposition to, what others thought about some region of natural
or spiritual life. Many a statement of Goethe's becomes comprehensible
only when one looks at the ways of picturing things which he found confronting
him and with which he came to terms in order to gain his own point of
view. How he thought and felt about this or that gives insight at the
same time into the nature of his own world view. If one wants to speak
about this region of Goethe's being, one must bring to expression much
that for him remained only unconscious feeling. In the conversation
with Schiller described here, there stood before Goethe's spiritual
eye a world view antithetical to his own. And this antithesis shows
how he felt about that way of picturing things which, originating from
one aspect of Hellenism, sees an abyss between sense experience and
spiritual experience, and how he, without any such abyss, saw the experience
of the senses and the experience of the spirit unite in a world picture
which communicated reality to him. If one wants to bring to life consciously
within oneself as thought what Goethe carried within him more or less
unconsciously as his view about the form of Western world views, then
these thoughts would be the following ones. In a fateful moment, a mistrust
of the human sense organs took possession of a Greek thinker. He began
to believe that these organs do not transmit the truth but rather that
they deceive him. He lost his trust in what naive, unbiased observation
offers. He found that thinking makes different statements about the
true being of things than experience does. It would be difficult to
say in whose head this mistrust first established itself. One encounters
it in the eleatic school of philosophers whose first representative
was Xenophanes, born about 570 B.C. in Kolophon. Parmenides appears
as the most important personality of this school, for he has maintained,
with a keenness like none before him, that there are two sources of
human knowledge. He declared that our sense impressions are delusion
and error, and that man can attain knowledge of what is true only through
pure thinking which takes no account of experience. Through the way
this conception of thinking and, of sense experience arose with Parmenides,
there was instilled into many following philosophies a developmental
illness from which scientific endeavors still suffer today. To discuss
the origin in Oriental views of this way of picturing things is out
of place within the framework of the Goethean world view.
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